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Abstract—Due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation,
the wireless air interface is open and accessible to both au-
thorized and illegitimate users. This completely differs from
a wired network, where communicating devices are physically
connected through cables and a node without direct association
is unable to access the network for illicit activities. The open
communications environment makes wireless transmissions more
vulnerable than wired communications to malicious attacks,
including both the passive eavesdropping for data interception
and the active jamming for disrupting legitimate transmissions.
Therefore, this paper is motivated to examine the security
vulnerabilities and threats imposed by the inherent open na-
ture of wireless communications and to devise efficient defense
mechanisms for improving the wireless network security. We
first summarize the security requirements of wireless networks,
including their authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability issues. Next, a comprehensive overview of security at-
tacks encountered in wireless networks is presented in view of
the network protocol architecture, where the potential security
threats are discussed at each protocol layer. We also provide a
survey of the existing security protocols and algorithms that are
adopted in the existing wireless network standards, such as the
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and the long-term evolution (LTE)
systems. Then, we discuss the state-of-the-art in physical-layer
security, which is an emerging technique of securing the open
communications environment against eavesdropping attacks at
the physical layer. Several physical-layer security techniques are
reviewed and compared, including information-theoretic security,
artificial noise aided security, security-oriented beamforming,
diversity assisted security, and physical-layer key generation
approaches. Since a jammer emitting radio signals can readily
interfere with the legitimate wireless users, we also introduce the
family of various jamming attacks and their counter-measures,
including the constant jammer, intermittent jammer, reactive
jammer, adaptive jammer and intelligent jammer. Additionally,
we discuss the integration of physical-layer security into existing
authentication and cryptography mechanisms for further secur-
ing wireless networks. Finally, some technical challenges which
remain unresolved at the time of writing are summarized and
the future trends in wireless security are discussed.
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NOMENCLATURE
3G 3rd Generation
AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
AP Access Point
ARQ Automatic Repeat reQuest
ASK Authenticated Secret Key
BS Base Station
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
CK(s) Ciphering Key(s)
CSI Channel State Information
CSMA/CA Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision
Avoidance
CST Carrier Sensing Time
CTS Clear to Send
DA Destination Address
DCF Distributed Coordination Function
DES Data Encryption Standard
DIFS Distributed Inter-Frame Space
DN Destination Node
DSSS Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum
DoS Denial of Service
EPC Evolved Packet Core
E-UTRAN Evolved-Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Net-
work
FHSS Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GSVD Generalized Singular Value Decomposition
HSS Home Subscriber Server
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ICV Integrity Check Value
IK(s) Integrity Key(s)
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
IP Internet Protocol
IV Initialization Vector
LTE Long Term Evolution
MAC Medium Access Control
MIC Message Integrity Check
MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE (ACCEPTED TO APPEAR) 2
MISOME Multiple-Input Single-Output Multiple-
Eavesdropper
MITM Man In The Middle
MME Mobility Management Entity
NIC Network Interface Controller
NP Non-deterministic Polynomial
OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PER Packet Error Rate
PKM Privacy and Key Management
PN Pseudo Noise
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
QoS Quality of Service
RFCOMM Radio Frequency COMMunications
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
RSS Received Signal Strength
RTS Request to Send
SA Source Address
SIFS Short Inter-Frame Space
SINR Signal-to-Interference-and-Noise Ratio
SQL Structured Query Language
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SN Source Node
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
SS Subscriber Station
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TA Transmitter Address
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDMA Time-Division Multiple Access
TK Temporal Key
TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TSC TKIP Sequence Counter
TTAK TKIP-mixed Transmit Address and Key
TTLS Tunneled Transport Layer Security
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UE(s) User Equipment(s)
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Ac-
cess
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
WMAN Wireless Metropolitan Area Network
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
WPA2 Wi-Fi Protected Access II
WPAN Wireless Personal Area Network
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the past decades, wireless communications in-frastructure and services have been proliferating with
the goal of meeting rapidly increasing demands [1], [2].
According to the latest statistics released by the International
Telecommunications Union in 2013 [3], the number of mobile
subscribers has reached 6.8 billion worldwide and almost
40% of the world’s population is now using the Internet.
Meanwhile, it has been reported in [4] that an increasing
number of wireless devices are abused for illicit cyber-criminal
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Fig. 1. Wireless security methodologies and design factors.
activities, including malicious attacks, computer hacking, data
forging, financial information theft, online bullying/stalking
and so on. This causes the direct loss of about 83 billion Euros
with an estimated 556 million users worldwide impacted by
cyber-crime each year, according to the 2012 Norton cyber-
crime report [4]. Hence, it is of paramount importance to
improve wireless communications security to fight against
cyber-criminal activities, especially because more and more
people are using wireless networks (e.g., cellular networks and
Wi-Fi) for online banking and personal emails, owing to the
widespread use of smartphones.
Wireless networks generally adopt the open systems in-
terconnection (OSI) protocol architecture [5] comprising the
application layer, transport layer, network layer [6], medium
access control (MAC) layer [7] and physical layer [8], [9].
Security threats and vulnerabilities associated with these pro-
tocol layers are typically protected separately at each layer
to meet the security requirements, including the authenticity,
confidentiality, integrity and availability [10]. For example,
cryptography is widely used for protecting the confidentiality
of data transmission by preventing information disclosure to
unauthorized users [11], [12]. Although cryptography im-
proves the achievable communications confidentiality, it re-
quires additional computational power and imposes latency
[13], since a certain amount of time is required for both
data encryption and decryption [14]. In order to guarantee
the authenticity of a caller or receiver, existing wireless
networks typically employ multiple authentication approaches
simultaneously at different protocol layers, including MAC-
layer authentication [15], network-layer authentication [16],
[17] and transport-layer authentication [18]. To be specific,
in the MAC layer, the MAC address of a user should be
authenticated to prevent unauthorized access. In the network
layer, the Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) and the Wi-Fi pro-
tected access II (WPA2) are two commonly used network-
layer authentication protocols [19], [20]. Additionally, the
transport-layer authentication includes the secure socket layer
(SSL) and its successor, namely the transport layer security
(TLS) protocols [21]-[23]. It becomes obvious that exploiting
multiple authentication mechanisms at different protocol layers
is capable of enhancing the wireless security, again, at the
cost of high computational complexity and latency. As shown
in Fig. 1, the main wireless security methodologies include
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the authentication, authorization and encryption, for which the
diverse design factors e.g. the security level, implementation
complexity and communication latency need to be balanced.
In wired networks, the communicating nodes are physically
connected through cables. By contrast, wireless networks are
extremely vulnerable owing to the broadcast nature of the
wireless medium. Explicitly, wireless networks are prone to
malicious attacks, including eavesdropping attack [24], denial-
of-service (DoS) attack [25], spoofing attack [26], man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attack [27], message falsification/injection
attack [28], etc. For example, an unauthorized node in a
wireless network is capable of inflicting intentional interfer-
ences with the objective of disrupting data communications
between legitimate users. Furthermore, wireless communica-
tions sessions may be readily overheard by an eavesdropper,
as long as the eavesdropper is within the transmit coverage
area of the transmitting node. In order to maintain confidential
transmission, existing systems typically employ cryptographic
techniques for preventing eavesdroppers from intercepting data
transmissions between legitimate users [29], [30]. Crypto-
graphic techniques assume that the eavesdropper has limited
computing power and rely upon the computational hardness
of their underlying mathematical problems. The security of a
cryptographic approach would be compromised, if an efficient
method of solving its underlying hard mathematical problem
was to be discovered [31], [32].
Recently, physical-layer security is emerging as a promis-
ing means of protecting wireless communications to achieve
information-theoretic security against eavesdropping attacks.
In [33], Wyner examined a discrete memoryless wiretap
channel consisting of a source, a destination as well as an
eavesdropper and proved that perfectly secure transmission can
be achieved, provided that the channel capacity of the main
link from the source to the destination is higher than that of
the wiretap link from the source to the eavesdropper. In [34],
Wyner’s results were extended from the discrete memoryless
wiretap channel to the Gaussian wiretap channel, where the
notion of a so-called secrecy capacity was developed, which
was shown to be equal to the difference between the channel
capacity of the main link and that of the wiretap link. If
the secrecy capacity falls below zero, the transmissions from
the source to the destination become insecure and the eaves-
dropper would become capable of intercepting the source’s
transmissions [35], [36]. In order to improve the attainable
transmission security, it is of importance to increase the
secrecy capacity by exploiting sophisticated signal processing
techniques, such as the artificial noise aided security [37]-[39],
security-oriented beamforming [40], [41], security-oriented
diversity approaches [42], [43] and so on.
In this paper, we are motivated to discuss diverse wireless at-
tacks as well as the corresponding defense mechanisms and to
explore a range of challenging open issues in wireless security
research. The main contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows. Firstly, a systematic review of security threats and
vulnerabilities is presented at the different protocol layers,
commencing from the physical layer up to the application
layer. Secondly, we summarize the family of security protocols
and algorithms used in the existing wireless networks, such as
the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX and long-term evolution (LTE)
standards. Thirdly, we discuss the emerging physical-layer
security in wireless communications and highlight the class
of information-theoretic security, artificial noise aided security,
security-oriented beamforming, security-oriented diversity and
physical-layer secret key generation techniques. Additionally,
we provide a review on various wireless jammers (i.e., the
constant jammer, intermittent jammer, reactive jammer, adap-
tive jammer and intelligent jammer) as well as their detection
and prevention techniques. Finally, we outline some of open
challenges in wireless security.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the security requirements of wireless networks,
where the authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability of wireless services are discussed. In Section III,
we analyze the security vulnerabilities and weaknesses of
wireless networks at different protocol layers, including the
application layer, transport layer, network layer, MAC layer
and physical layer. Next, in Section IV, the security protocols
and algorithms used in existing wireless networks, such as the
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX and LTE standards, are discussed.
Then, Section V presents the physical-layer security which is
emerging as an effective paradigm conceived for improving
the security of wireless communications against eavesdrop-
ping attacks by exploiting the physical-layer characteristics of
wireless channels. In Section VI, we characterize the family
of wireless jamming attacks and their counter-measures, while
in Section VII, we discuss how physical-layer security may
be invoked for efficiently complementing the existing suite of
classic authentication and cryptography mechanisms. These
discussions are followed by Section VIII, where some of
the open challenges and future trends in wireless security
are presented. Finally, Section IX provides our concluding
remarks.
II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Again, in wireless networks, the information is exchanged
among authorized users, but this process is vulnerable to
various malicious threats owing to the broadcast nature of
the wireless medium. The security requirements of wireless
networks are specified for the sake of protecting the wireless
transmissions against wireless attacks, such as eavesdropping
attack, DoS attack, data falsification attack, node compromise
attack and so on [44], [45]. For example, maintaining data
confidentiality is a typical security requirement, which refers
to the capability of restricting data access to authorized users
only, while preventing eavesdroppers from intercepting the
information. Generally speaking, secure wireless communica-
tions should satisfy the requirements of authenticity, confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability [46], as detailed below:
• Authenticity: Authenticity refers to confirming the true
identity of a network node to distinguish authorized users
from unauthorized users. In wireless networks, a pair
of communicating nodes should first perform mutual
authentication before establishing a communications link
for data transmission [47]. Typically, a network node
is equipped with a wireless network interface card and
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has a unique medium access control (MAC) address,
which can be used for authentication purposes. Again, in
addition to MAC authentication, there are other wireless
authentication methods, including network-layer authen-
tication, transport-layer authentication and application-
layer authentication.
• Confidentiality: The confidentiality refers to limiting
the data access to intended users only, while prevent-
ing the disclosure of the information to unauthorized
entities [48]. Considering the symmetric key encryption
technique as an example, the source node first encrypts
the original data (often termed as plain-text) using an
encryption algorithm with the aid of a secret key that
is shared with the intended destination only. Next, the
encrypted plain-text (referred to as cipher-text) is trans-
mitted to the destination that then decrypts its received
cipher-text using the secret key. Since the eavesdropper
has no knowledge of the secret key, it is unable to
interpret the plain-text based on the overheard cipher-text.
Traditionally, the classic Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol is used to achieve the key exchange between
the source and destination and requires a trusted key
management center [32]. Recently, physical-layer security
emerges as a means of protecting the confidentiality of
wireless transmission against eavesdropping attacks for
achieving information-theoretic security [33], [49]. The
details of physical-layer security will be discussed in
Section V.
• Integrity: The integrity of information transmitted in a
wireless network should be accurate and reliable during
its entire life-cycle representing the source-information
without any falsification and modification by unautho-
rized users. The data integrity may be violated by so-
called insider attacks, such as for example node com-
promise attacks [50]-[52]. More specifically, a legitimate
node that is altered and compromised by an adversary,
is termed as a compromised node. The compromised
node may inflict damage upon the data integrity by
launching malicious attacks, including message injection,
false reporting, data modification and so on. In general, it
is quiet challenging to detect the attacks by compromised
nodes, since these compromised nodes running malicious
codes still have valid identities. A promising solution to
detect compromised nodes is to utilize the automatic code
update and recovery process, which guarantees that the
nodes are periodically patched and a compromised node
may be detected, if the patch fails. The compromised
nodes can be repaired and revoked through the so-called
code recovery process.
• Availability: The availability implies that the authorized
users are indeed capable of accessing a wireless network
anytime and anywhere upon request. The violation of
availability, referred to as denial of service, will result
in the authorized users to become unable to access the
wireless network, which in turn results in unsatisfactory
user experience [53], [54]. For example, any unauthorized
node is capable of launching DoS activities at the physical
TABLE I
SUMMARIZATION OF WIRELESS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
Authenticity
Confidentiality
Availability
Security Requirements
Specified to differentiate authorized users from
unauthorized users
Specified to limit the confidential data access to 
intended users only
Specified to guarantee the accuracy of the trans-
mitted information without any falsification
Specified to make sure that the authorized users 
can access wireless network resources anytime 
and anywhere upon request
Specific Objectives to be Achieved
Integrity
layer by maliciously generating interferences for dis-
rupting the desired communications between legitimate
users, which is also known as a jamming attack. In order
to combat jamming attacks, existing wireless systems
typically consider the employment of spread spectrum
techniques, including direct-sequence spread spectrum
(DSSS) [55], [56] and frequency-hopping spread spec-
trum (FHSS) solutions [57]. To be specific, DSSS em-
ploys a pseudo-noise (PN) sequence to spread the spec-
trum of the original signal to a wide frequency bandwidth.
In this way, the jamming attack operating without the
knowledge of the PN sequence has to dissipate a much
higher power for disrupting the legitimate transmission,
which may not be feasible in practice due to its realistic
power constraint. As an alternative, FHSS continuously
changes the central frequency of the transmitted wave-
form using a certain frequency-hopping pattern, so that
the jamming attacker cannot monitor and interrupt the
legitimate transmissions.
The above-mentioned authenticity, confidentiality, integrity
and availability are summarized in Table I, which are com-
monly considered and implemented in the existing wireless
networks, including the Bluetooth [58], Wi-Fi [59], Worldwide
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) [60], Long-
Term Evolution (LTE) [61] standards and so on. In principle,
wireless networks should be as secure as wired networks. This
implies that the security requirements of wireless networks
should be the same as those of wired networks, including
the requirements of authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and
availability. However, due to the broadcast nature of radio
propagation, achieving these security requirements in wireless
networks is more challenging than in wired networks. For
example, the availability of wireless networks is extremely
vulnerable, since a jamming attack imposing a radio signal can
readily disrupt and block the wireless physical-layer communi-
cations. Hence, compared to wired networks, wireless systems
typically employ an additional DSSS (or FHSS) technique in
order to protect the wireless transmissions against jamming
attacks.
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Fig. 3. Relationship between the wired and wireless attacks.
III. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN WIRELESS
NETWORKS
In this section, we present a systematic review of various
security vulnerabilities and weaknesses encountered in wire-
less networks. Apart from their differences, wired and wireless
networks also share some similarities. For example, they both
adopt the OSI layered protocol architecture consisting of the
physical layer, MAC layer, network layer, transport layer
and application layer. As shown in Fig. 2, a network node
(denoted by node A) employs these protocols for transmitting
its data packets to another network node (i.e., node B).
To be specific, the data packet at node A is first extended
with the protocol overheads, including the application-layer
overhead, transport-layer overhead, network-layer overhead,
MAC overhead and physical-layer overhead. This results in
an encapsulated packet. Then, the resultant data packet is
transmitted via the wireless medium to node B, which will
perform packet-decapsulation, commencing from the physical
layer and proceeding upward to the application layer, in order
to recover the original data packet. Note that the difference
between the wired and wireless networks mainly lies in the
PHY and MAC layers, while the application, transport and
TABLE II
MAIN PROTOCOLS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF THE WIRELESS OSI LAYERS.
Application
Transport
Network
MAC
PHY
OSI Layers
HTTP, FTP, SMTP [62]
TCP, UDP [63], [64]
IP, ICMP [65]
CSMA/CA, ALOHA, CDMA [66], OFDMA [67]
Transmission Medium, Coding and Modulation
Main Protocols and Specifications
network layers of wireless networks are typically identical to
those of wired networks. As a consequence, the wired and
wireless networks share some common security vulnerabilities
owing to their identical application, transport and network
layers. Nevertheless, they also suffer from mutually exclusive
attacks due to the fact that the wired and wireless networks
have different PHY and MAC layers, as shown in Fig. 3.
Table II shows the main protocols and specifications im-
plemented at each of wireless OSI layers. For example,
the application-layer supports the hypertext transfer protocol
(HTTP) for the sake of delivering web services, while the file
transfer protocol (FTP) is used for large-file-transfer, and the
simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) is invoked for electronic
mail (e-mail) transmission and so on [62]. The commonly
used transport-layer protocols include the transport control
protocol (TCP) and the user datagram protocol (UDP) [63],
[64]. The TCP ensures the reliable and ordered delivery of data
packets, whereas UDP has no guarantee of such reliable and
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TABLE III
MAIN TYPES OF WIRELESS ATTACKS AT THE PHY LAYER.
Eavesdropping
Jamming
PHY Attacks
Interception of confidential information [71]
Interruption of legitimate transmission [72]
Characteristics and Features
ordered delivery. In contrast to TCP, UDP has no handshaking
dialogues and adopts a simpler transmission model, hence
imposing a reduced protocol overhead. In the network layer,
we also have different protocols, such as the Internet protocol
(IP), which was conceived for delivering data packets based
on IP addresses, and the Internet control message protocol
(ICMP) designed for sending error messages for indicating,
for example, that a requested service is unavailable or that
a network node could not be reached [65]. Regarding the
MAC layer, there are numerous different protocols adopted
by various wireless networks, such as the carrier sense mul-
tiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) used in
Wi-Fi networks, the slotted ALOHA employed in tactical
satellite networks by military forces, code division multiple
access (CDMA) involved in third-generation (3G) mobile net-
works [66] and orthogonal frequency-division multiple access
(OFDMA) adopted in the long term evolution (LTE) and
LTE-advanced networks [67]. Additionally, the physical layer
specifies the physical characteristics of information transmis-
sion, including the transmission medium, modulation, line
coding, multiplexing, circuit switching, pulse shaping, forward
error correction, bit-interleaving and other channel coding
operations, etc.
Every OSI layer has its own unique security challenges
and issues, since different layers rely on different protocols,
hence exhibiting different security vulnerabilities [68]-[70].
Below we summarize the range of wireless attacks potentially
encountered by various protocol layers.
A. Physical-Layer Attacks
The physical layer is the lowest layer in the OSI proto-
col architecture, which is used for specifying the physical
characteristics of signal transmission. Again, the broadcast
nature of wireless communications makes its physical layer
extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping and jamming attacks,
which are two main types of wireless physical-layer attacks,
as depicted in Table III. More specifically, the eavesdropping
attack refers to an unauthorized user attempting to intercept the
data transmission between legitimate users [71]. In wireless
networks, as long as an eavesdropper lies in the transmit
coverage area of the source node, the wireless communica-
tions session can be overheard by the eavesdropper. In order
to maintain confidential transmission, typically cryptographic
techniques relying on secret keys are adopted for preventing
eavesdropping attacks from intercepting the data transmission.
To be specific, the source node (SN) and destination node (DN)
share a secret key and the so-called plain-text is first encrypted
at SN, leading to the cipher-text, which is then transmitted to
TABLE IV
MAIN TYPES OF WIRELESS ATTACKS AT THE MAC LAYER.
MAC spoofing
Identity theft
MAC Attacks
Falsification of MAC address [73]
Stealing of a legitimate user's MAC identity
Characteristics and Features
MITM attack Impersonation of a pair of communicating nodes [74]
Network injection Injection of forged network commands and packets [75]
DN. In this case, even if an eavesdropper overhears the cipher-
text transmission, it remains difficult to extract the plain-text
from the cipher-text without the secret key.
Moreover, a malicious node in wireless networks can read-
ily generate intentional interference for disrupting the data
communications between legitimate users, which is referred
to as a jamming attack (also known as DoS attack) [72]. The
jammer aims for preventing authorized users from accessing
wireless network resources and this impairs the network avail-
ability for the legitimate users. To this end, spread spectrum
techniques are widely recognized as an effective means of
defending against DoS attacks by spreading the transmit signal
over a wider spectral bandwidth than its original frequency
band. Again, the above-mentioned DSSS and FHSS techniques
exhibit a high jamming-resistance at the physical layer.
B. MAC-Layer Attacks
The MAC layer enables multiple network nodes to access
a shared medium with the aid of intelligent channel access
control mechanisms such as CSMA/CA, CDMA, OFDMA
and so on. Typically, each network node is equipped with a
network interface controller (NIC) and has a unique MAC
address, which is used for user authentication. An attacker
that attempts to change its assigned MAC address with a
malicious intention is termed as MAC spoofing, which is the
primary technique of MAC attacks [73]. Although the MAC
address is hard-coded into the NIC of a network node, it is
still possible for a network node to spoof a MAC address
and thus MAC spoofing enables the malicious node to hide
its true identity or to impersonate another network node for
the sake of carrying out illicit activities. Furthermore, a MAC
attacker may overhear the network traffic and steal a legitimate
node’s MAC address by analyzing the overheard traffic, which
is referred to as an identity-theft attack. An attacker attempting
identity theft will pretend to be another legitimate network
node and gain access to confidential information of the victim
node.
In addition to the above-mentioned MAC spoofing and
identity theft, the class of MAC-layer attacks also includes
MITM attacks [74] and network injection [75]. Typically,
a MITM attack refers to an attacker that first ‘sniffs’ the
network’s traffic in order to intercept the MAC addresses of a
pair of legitimate communicating nodes, then impersonates the
two victims and finally establishes a connection with them. In
this way, the MITM attacker acts as a relay between the pair
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TABLE V
MAIN TYPES OF WIRELESS ATTACKS AT THE NETWORK LAYER.
IP spoofing
IP hijacking
Network Attacks
Falsification of IP address [76]
Impersonation of a legitimate user’s IP address [77], [78]
Characteristics and Features
Smurf attack
Paralyzation of a network by launching a huge number 
of ICMP requests [79]
of victims and makes them feel that they are communicating
directly with each other over a private connection. In reality,
their session was intercepted and controlled by the attacker.
By contrast, the network injection attack aims for preventing
the operation of networking devices, such as routers, switches,
etc. by injecting forged network re-configuration commands.
In this manner, if an overwhelming number of the forged
networking commands are initiated, the entire network may
become paralyzed, thus requiring rebooting or even repro-
gramming of all networking devices. The main types of
wireless MAC attacks are summarized in Table IV.
C. Network-Layer Attacks
In the network layer, IP was designed as the principal
protocol for delivering packets from a SN to a DN through
intermediate routers based on their IP addresses. The network-
layer attacks mainly aim for exploiting IP weaknesses, which
include the IP spoofing and hijacking as well as the so-called
Smurf attack [76]-[78], as illustrated in Table V. To be specific,
IP spoofing is used for generating a forged IP address with the
goal of hiding the true identity of the attacker or impersonating
another network node for carrying out illicit activities. The
network node that receives these packets associated with a
forged source IP address will send its responses back to
the forged IP address. This will waste significant network
capacity and might even paralyze the network by flooding it
with forged IP packets. IP hijacking is another illegitimate
activity launched by hijackers for the sake of taking over
another legitimate user’s IP address. If the attacker succeeds
in hijacking the IP address, it will be able to disconnect the
legitimate user and create a new connection to the network
by impersonating the legitimate user, hence gaining access to
confidential information. There are some other forms of IP hi-
jacking techniques, including prefix hijacking, route hijacking
and border gateway protocol hijacking [78].
The Smurf attack is a DoS attack in the network layer,
which intends to send a huge number of ICMP packets (with
a spoofed source IP address) to a victim node or to a group of
victims using an IP broadcast address [79]. Upon receiving the
ICMP requests, the victims are required to send back ICMP
responses, resulting in a significant amount of traffic in the
victim network. When the Smurf attack launches a sufficiently
high number of ICMP requests, the victim network will
become overwhelmed and paralyzed by these ICMP requests
and responses. To defend against Smurf attacks, a possible
TABLE VI
MAIN TYPES OF WIRELESS ATTACKS AT THE TRANSPORT LAYER.
TCP flooding
UDP flooding
Transport Attacks
Sending a huge number of ping requests [80], [81]
Launching an overwhelming number of UDP packets [82]
Characteristics and Features
TCP sequence
prediction attack
Fabrication of a legitimate user’s data packets using the 
predicted TCP sequence index
solution is to configure the individual users and routers by
ensuring that they do not to constantly respond to ICMP
requests. We may also consider the employment of firewalls,
which can reject the malicious packets arriving from the forged
source IP addresses.
D. Transport-Layer Attacks
This subsection briefly summarizes the malicious activities
in the transport layer, with an emphasis on the TCP and UDP
attacks. To be specific, TCP is a connection-oriented transport
protocol designed for supporting the reliable transmission of
data packets, which is typically used for delivering e-mails
and for transferring files from one network node to another.
In contrast to TCP, UDP is a connectionless transport protocol
associated with a reduced protocol overhead and latency, but
as a price, it fails to guarantee reliable data delivery. It is often
used by delay-sensitive applications which do not impose strict
reliability requirements, such as IP television, voice over IP
and online games. Both TCP and UDP suffer from security
vulnerabilities including the TCP and UDP flooding as well as
the TCP sequence number prediction attacks, as summarized
in Table VI.
TCP attacks include TCP flooding attacks and sequence
number prediction attacks [80], [81]. The TCP flooding, which
is also known as ping flooding, is a DoS attack in the transport
layer, where the attacker sends an overwhelming number of
ping requests, such as ICMP echo requests to a victim node,
which then responds by sending ping replies, such as ICMP
echo replies. This will flood both the input and output buffers
of the victim node and it might even delay its connection
to the target network, when the number of ping requests is
sufficiently high. The TCP sequence prediction technique is
another TCP attack that attempts to predict the sequence index
of TCP packets of a transmitting node and then fabricates the
TCP packets of the node. To be specific, the TCP sequence
prediction attacker first guesses the TCP sequence index of a
victim transmitter, then fabricates packets using the predicted
TCP index, and finally sends its fabricated packets to a victim
receiver. Naturally, the TCP sequence prediction attack will
inflict damage upon the data integrity owing to the above-
mentioned packet fabrication and injection.
The UDP is also prone to flooding attacks, which are
imposed by sending an overwhelming number of UDP pack-
ets, instead of ping requests used in the TCP flood attack.
Specifically, a UDP flood attacker transmits a large number
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TABLE VII
MAIN TYPES OF WIRELESS ATTACKS AT THE APPLICATION LAYER.
Malware attack
SQL injection
Application Attacks
Malicious software in the form of code, scripts and 
active content programmed by attackers [85]
Inserting rogue SQL statements attempting to gain 
unauthorized access to legitimate websites
Characteristics and Features
Cross-site scripting
Injecting client-side scripts into web pages for by-
passing some of the access control measures
FTP bounce
Impersonating a legtimate user to gain unauthorized 
access [83]
SMTP attack
Malicious attacks in e-mail transfering between the 
SMTP servers and clients
of UDP packets to a victim node, which will be forced to
send numerous reply packets [82]. In this way, the victim
node will be overwhelmed by the malicious UDP packets and
becomes unreachable by other legitimate nodes. Moreover, the
UDP flooding attacker is capable of hiding itself from the
legitimate nodes by using a spoofed IP address for generating
malicious UDP packets. The negative impact of such UDP
flooding attacks is mitigated by limiting the response rate
of UDP packets. Furthermore, firewalls can be employed for
defending against the UDP flooding attacks for filtering out
malicious UDP packets.
E. Application-Layer Attacks
As mentioned above, the application layer supports HTTP
[62] for web services, FTP [83] for file transfer and SMTP
[84] for e-mail transmission. Each of these protocols is prone
to security attacks. Logically, the application-layer attacks
may hence be classified as HTTP attacks, FTP attacks and
SMTP attacks. More specifically, HTTP is the application
protocol designed for exchanging hypertext across the World
Wide Web, which is subject to numerous security threats. The
main HTTP attacks include the Malware attack (e.g., Trojan
horse, viruses, worms, backdoors, keyloggers, etc.), structured
query language (SQL) injection attack and cross-site scripting
attack [85]. The terminology Malware refers to malicious
software which is in the form of code, scripts and active
content programmed by attackers attempting to disrupt legit-
imate transmissions or to intercept confidential information.
The SQL injection is usually exploited to attack data-driven
applications by inserting certain rogue SQL statements with
an attempt to gain unauthorized access to legitimate websites.
The last type of HTTP attacks to be mentioned is referred
to as cross-site scripting attacks that typically occur in web
applications and aim for bypassing some of the access control
measures (e.g., the same-origin-policy) by injecting client-side
scripts into web pages [85].
The FTP is used for large-file transfer from one network
node to another, which also exhibits certain security vulnera-
bilities. The FTP bounce attacks and directory traversal attacks
often occur in FTP applications [83]. The FTP bounce attack
exploits the PORT command in order to request access to
Application attacks
Wireless Attacks
Transport attacks
Network attacks
MAC attacks
PHY attacks
Application attacks
Wired Attacks
Transport attacks
Network attacks
MAC attacks
PHY attacks
Comparison
different
different
same
same
same
Fig. 4. Comparison between the wireless and wired networks in terms of
security attacks at different OSI layers.
ports through another victim node, acting as a middle-man.
We note however that most modern FTP servers are configured
by default to refuse PORT commands in order to prevent FTP
bounce attacks. The directory traversal attack attempts to gain
unauthorized access to legitimate file systems by exploiting
any potential security vulnerability during the validation of
user-supplied input file names. In contrast to FTP, the SMTP is
an application-layer protocol designed for transferring e-mails
across the Internet, which, however, does not encrypt private
information, such as the login username, the password and the
messages themselves transmitted between the SMTP servers
and clients, hence raising a serious privacy concern. Moreover,
e-mails are frequent carriers of viruses and worms. Thus, the
SMTP attacks include the password ‘sniffing’, SMTP viruses
and worms as well as e-mail spoofing [84]. Typically, antivirus
software or firewalls (or both) are adopted for identifying and
guarding against the aforementioned application-layer attacks.
Table VII summarizes the aforementioned main attacks at the
application layer.
Finally, we summarize the similarities and differences be-
tween the wireless and wired networks in terms of their
security attacks at the different OSI layers. As shown in Fig. 4,
the application, transport and network-layer attacks of wireless
networks are the same as those of wired networks, since the
wireless and wired networks share common protocols at the
application, transport and network layers. By contrast, wireless
networks are different from wired networks in terms of the
PHY and MAC attacks. In general, only the PHY and MAC
layers are specified in wireless networking standards (e.g., Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth, LTE, etc.). In wireless networks, conventional
security protocols are defined at the MAC layer (sometimes
at the logical-link-control layer) for establishing a trusted
and confidential link, which will be summarized for different
commercial wireless networks in Section IV. Additionally, the
wireless PHY layer is completely different from its wireline
based counterpart. Due to the broadcast nature of radio propa-
gation, the wireless PHY layer is extremely vulnerable to both
the eavesdropping and jamming attacks. To this end, physical-
layer security is emerging as an effective means of securing
wireless communications against eavesdropping, as it will be
discussed in Section V. Next, Section VI will present various
wireless jamming attacks and their counter-measures.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE (ACCEPTED TO APPEAR) 9
WPAN
WLAN
WMAN
2
5
0
m
1
0
0
k
m
2
M
b
/s
1
5
0
M
b
/s
1
G
b
/s
Bluetooth
Wi-Fi
WiMAX, LTE
Network type
Industrial standards
C
o
v
erag
e area P
ea
k
 d
at
a 
ra
te
1
0
0
m
Fig. 5. A family of wireless networks consisting of the wireless personal
area network (WPAN), wireless local area network (WLAN) and wireless
metropolitan area network (WMAN).
IV. SECURITY DEFENSE PROTOCOLS AND PARADIGMS
FOR WIRELESS NETWORKS
This section is focused on the family of security protocols
and paradigms that are used for improving the security of
wireless networks. As compared to wired networks, the wire-
less networks have the advantage of avoiding the deployment
of a costly cable based infrastructure. The stylized illustration
of operational wireless networks is shown in Fig. 5, where
the family of wireless personal area networks (WPAN), wire-
less local area networks (WLAN) and wireless metropolitan
area networks (WMAN) are illustrated, which complement
each other with the goal of providing users with ubiquitous
broadband wireless services [86]. The objective of Fig. 5 is
to provide a comparison amongst the WPAN, WLAN and
WMAN techniques from different perspectives in terms of
their industrial standards, coverage area and peak data rates.
More specifically, a WPAN is typically used for interconnect-
ing with personal devices (e.g., a keyboard, audio headset,
printer, etc.) at a relatively low data rate and within a small
coverage area. For example, Bluetooth is a common WPAN
standard using short-range radio coverage in the industrial,
scientific and medical band spanning the band 2400-2480MHz,
which can provide a peak data rate of 2Mbs and a range of
up to 100 meters (m) [87]. Fig. 5 also shows that a WLAN
generally has a higher data rate and a wider coverage area
than the WPAN, which is used for connecting wireless devices
through an access point (AP) within a local coverage area. As
an example, IEEE 802.11 (also known as Wi-Fi) consists of a
series of industrial WLAN standards. Modern Wi-Fi standards
are capable of supporting a peak data rate of 150Mbs and a
maximum range of 250m [88]. Finally, a MAN is typically
used for connecting a metropolitian city at a higher rate and
over a lager coverage area than the WPAN and WLAN. For
instance, in Fig. 5, we feature two types of industrial standards
for WMAN, namely WiMAX and LTE [89], [90].
User Interface
Application Application Application
Security 
Manager
RFCOMM
(or other multiplexing protocol)
L2CAP
HCI
Link Manager/Controller
Device
Database
Service
Database
General 
Managament 
Entity
Query Registration
L2CAP: Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol 
HCI: Host Controller Interface
RFCOMM: Radio Frequency Communication
Fig. 6. Bluetooth security architecture.
In the following, we will present an overview of the security
protocols used in the aforementioned wireless standards (i.e.,
the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX and LTE) for protecting the
authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and availability of legiti-
mate transmissions through the wireless propagation medium.
A. Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a short-range and low-power wireless network-
ing standard, which has been widely implemented in com-
puting and communications devices as well as in peripherals,
such as cell phones, keyboards, audio headsets, etc. However,
Bluetooth devices are subject to a large number of wireless
security threats and may easily become compromised. As a
protection, Bluetooth introduces diverse security features and
protocols for guaranteeing its transmissions against potentially
serious attacks [91]. For security reasons, each Bluetooth
device has four entities [92], including the Bluetooth device
address (BD ADDR), private authentication key, private en-
cryption key and a random number (RAND), which are used
for authentication, authorization and encryption, respectively.
More specifically, the BD ADDR contains 48 bits, which
is unique for each Bluetooth device. The 128-bit private
authentication key is used for authentication and the private
encryption key that varies from 8 to 128 bits in length is used
for encryption. In addition, RAND is a frequently changing
128-bit pseudo-random number generated by the Bluetooth
device itself.
Fig. 6 illustrates the Bluetooth security architecture, where
the key component is the security manager responsible for
authentication, authorization and encryption [91]. As shown
in Fig. 6, the service database and device database are mainly
used for storing the security-related information on services
and devices, respectively, which can be adjusted through the
user interface. These databases can also be administrated by
the general management entity. When a Bluetooth device
receives an access request from another device, it will first
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Fig. 7. Bluetooth authentication process.
query its security manager with the aid of its radio frequency
communications (RFCOMM) or other multiplexing protocols.
Then, the security manager has to respond to the query as to
whether to allow the access or not by checking both the service
database and device database. The generic access profile of
Bluetooth defines three security modes:
(I) security mode 1 (non-secure), where no security proce-
dure is initiated;
(II) security mode 2 (service-level enforced security), where
the security procedure is initiated after establishing a link
between the Bluetooth transmitter and receiver;
(III) security mode 3 (link level enforced security), where
the security procedure is initiated before the link’s establish-
ment [91].
In Bluetooth systems, a device is classified into one
of three categories: trusted/untrusted device, authenti-
cated/unauthenticated device and unknown device. The trusted
device category implies that the device has been authenticated
and authorized as a trusted and fixed relationship, hence has
unrestricted access to all services. By contrast, the untrusted
device category refers to the fact that the device has indeed
been authenticated successfully, but has no permanent fixed
relationship, hence it is restricted to specific services. If a
Bluetooth device is successfully authenticated, but has not
completed any authorization process, it will be considered
as an authenticated device. By definition, an unauthenticated
device failed to authenticate and has a limited access to
services. If a device has not passed any authentication and
authorization process, it is classified as an unknown device
and hence it is restricted to access services requiring the lowest
privilege. Additionally, the Bluetooth services are also divided
into the following three security levels: (1) authorization-
level services, which can be accessed by trusted devices only;
(2) authentication-level services, which require authentication,
but no authorization. Hence, they remain inaccessible to the
unauthenticated devices and unknown devices; and (3) open
services, which are open to access by all devices. Below, we
would like to discuss the detailed procedures of authentication,
authorization and encryption in Bluetooth.
The authentication represents the process of verifying the
identity of Bluetooth devices based on the BD ADDR and
link key. As shown in Fig. 7, the Bluetooth authentication
adopts a “challenge-response scheme” [93], where the verifier
Authentication 
starts
Trusted or not?
Creation of 
trust allowed
Authorisation
Creation of 
trust
Authorisation 
ok
Authorisation 
fails
yes
no
yes
yes
no
no
Fig. 8. Flow chart of Bluetooth authorization.
(Unit A) challenges the claimant (Unit B) which then responds
for the sake of authentication. To be specific, the claimant first
requests the verifier to establish a link and then exchanges a
link key that is a 128-bit random number. Next, an authen-
tication request with the claimant’s address BD ADDRB is
sent to the verifier, which returns a random number denoted
by AU RANDA. Then, both the verifier and claimant perform
the same authentication function using the random number
AU RANDA, the claimant’s address BD ADDRB, and the link
key to obtain their responses denoted by SRES’ and SRES,
respectively. Finally, the claimant sends its response SRES to
the verifier, which will compare SRES with its own response
SRES’. If SRES is identical to SRES’, the authentication is
confirmed. By contrast, a mismatch between SRES’ and SRES
represents an authentication failure.
The authorization process is used for deciding whether a
Bluetooth device has the right to access a certain service.
Typically, trusted devices are allowed to access all services,
however untrusted or unknown devices require authorization,
before their access to services is granted. Fig. 8 shows a flow
chart of the Bluetooth authorization process. Observe from
Fig. 8 that the authorization process commences with checking
the device database for deciding whether the Bluetooth device
was authorized previously and considered trusted. If the Blue-
tooth device is trusted, the authorization is concluded. Other-
wise, the authorization and the trust-creation will be performed
sequentially. If the authorization fails, the access to certain
services will be denied. Meanwhile, a successful authorization
makes the corresponding Bluetooth devices trustworthy for
accessing all services.
Additionally, encryption is employed in Bluetooth to protect
the confidentiality of transmissions. The payload of a Blue-
tooth data packet is encrypted by using a stream cipher, which
consists of the payload key generator and key stream generator
[93]. To be specific, first a payload key is generated with the
aid of the link key and Bluetooth device address, which is then
used for generating the key stream. Finally, the key stream and
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plain-text are added in modulo-2 in order to obtain the ciper
text. It is pointed out that the payload key generator simply
combines the input bits in an appropriate order and shifts them
to four linear feedback shift registers to obtain the payload
key. Moreover, the key stream bits are generated by using a
method derived from the summation stream cipher generator
by Massey and Rueppel [93].
B. Wi-Fi
The family of Wi-Fi networks mainly based on the IEEE
802.11 b/g standards has been explosively expanding. The
most common security protocols in Wi-Fi are referred to as
wired equivalent privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi protected access
(WPA) [94]. WEP was proposed in 1999 as a security measure
for Wi-Fi networks to make wireless data transmissions as
secure as in traditional wired networks. However, WEP has
been shown to be a relatively weak security protocol, having
numerous flaws. Hence, it can be ‘cracked’ in a few minutes
using a basic laptop computer. As an alternative, WPA was put
forward in 2003 for replacing WEP, while the improved Wi-Fi
protected access II (WPA2) constitutes an upgraded version of
the WPA standard. Typically, WPA and WPA2 are more secure
than WEP and thus they are widely used in modern Wi-Fi
networks. Below, we detail the authentication and encryption
processes of the WEP, WPA and WPA2 protocols.
The WEP protocol consists of two main parts, namely the
authentication part and encryption part, aiming for establishing
access control by preventing unauthorized access without an
appropriate WEP key and hence they achieve data privacy by
encrypting the data streams with the aid of the WEP key.
As shown in Fig. 9, the WEP authentication uses a four-step
‘challenge-response’ handshake between a Wi-Fi client and an
access point operating with the aid of a shared WEP key. To be
specific, the client first sends an authentication request to the
access point, which then replies with a plain-text challenge.
After that, the client encrypts its received ‘challenge-text’ us-
ing a pre-shared WEP key and sends the encrypted text to the
access point. It then decrypts the received encrypted text with
the aid of the pre-shared WEP key and attempts to compare the
decrypted text to the original plain-text. If a match is found,
the access point sends a successful authentication indicator to
the client. Otherwise, the authentication is considered as failed.
Following the authentication, WEP activates the process of
encrypting data streams using the simple rivest cipher 4 algo-
rithm operating with the aid of the pre-shared WEP key [96].
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Fig. 10. Block diagram of WEP encryption.
Fig. 10 shows a block diagram of the WEP encryption, where
first an initialization vector (IV) of 24 bits is concatenated to
a 40-bit WEP key. This leads to a 64-bit seed for a pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG), which is then used for
generating the key stream. Additionally, an integrity check
algorithm is performed such as a cyclic redundancy check on
the plain-text in order to obtain an integrity check value (ICV),
which can then be used for protecting the data transmission
from malicious tampering. Then, the ICV is concatenated
with the plain-text, which will be further combined with the
aforementioned key stream in modulo-2 for generating the
ciper-text. Although WEP carries out both the authentication
and encryption functions, it still remains prone to security
threats. For example, WEP fails to protect the information
against forgery and replay attacks, hence an attacker may be
capable of intentionally either modifying or replaying the data
packets without the legitimate users becoming aware that data
falsification and/or replay has taken place. Furthermore, the
secret keys used in WEP may be ‘cracked’ in a few minutes
using a basic laptop computer [97]. Additionally, it is easy for
an attacker to forge an authentication message in WEP, which
makes it straightforward for unauthorized users to pretend to
be legitimate users and hence to steal confidential information
[98].
As a remedy, WPA was proposed for addressing the afore-
mentioned WEP security problems, which was achieved by
Wi-Fi users without the need of changing their hardware. The
WPA standard has two main types:
1) Personal WPA is mainly used in home without the
employment of an authentication server, where a secret key
is pre-shared between the client and access point, which is
termed as WPA-PSK (pre-shared key);
2) Enterprise WPA used for enterprise networks, which
requires an authentication server 802.1x for carrying out the
security control in order to effectively guard against malicious
attacks.
The main advantage of WPA over WEP is that WPA
employs more powerful data encryption referred to as the
temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP), which is assisted
by a message integrity check (MIC) invoked for the sake
of protecting the data integrity and confidentiality of Wi-Fi
networks [99], [100]. Fig. 11 shows the TKIP encryption
process, in which the transmitter address (TA), the temporal
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key (TK) and the TKIP sequence counter (TSC) constitute the
inputs of the Phase I Key Mixing process, invoked in order
to obtain a so-called TKIP-mixed transmit address and key
(TTAK), which is then further processed along with the TSC
in the Phase II Key Mixing stage for deriving the WEP seed,
including a WEP IV and a base key. Furthermore, observe in
Fig. 11 that the message integrity check (MIC) is performed
both on the source address (SA), as well as on the destination
address (DA) and the plain-text. The resultant MIC will then
be appended to the plain-text, which is further fragmented into
multiple packets, each assigned with a unique TSC. Finally,
the WEP seed and plain-text packets are used for deriving
the cipher-text by invoking the WEP encryption, as discussed
earlier in Fig. 10, which is often implemented in the hardware
of Wi-Fi devices. We note that even the WPA relying on the
TKIP remains vulnerable to diverse practical attacks [101].
WiMAX (also known as IEEE 802.16) is a standard devel-
oped for wireless metropolitan area networks (WMAN) and
the initial WiMAX system was designed for providing a peak
data rate of 40 Mbps. In order to meet the requirements of the
International Mobile Telecommunications-Advanced initiative,
IEEE 802.16m was proposed as an updated version of the
original WiMAX, which is capable of supporting a peak data
rate of 1 Gbps for stationary reception and 100 Mbps for
mobile reception [102]. As all other wireless systems, WiMAX
also faces various wireless attacks and provides advanced
features for enhancing the attainable transmission security. To
be specific, a security sub-layer is introduced in the protocol
stack of the WiMAX standard, as shown in Fig. 12 [103].
C. WiMAX
It is observed from Fig. 12(a) that the protocol stack
of a WiMAX system defines two main layers, namely the
physical (PHY) layer and medium access control (MAC) layer.
Moreover, the MAC layer consists of three sub-layers, namely
the service specific convergence sub-layer, the common part
sub-layer and the security sub-layer. All the security issues and
risks are considered and addressed in the security sub-layer.
Fig. 12(b) shows the WiMAX security sub-layer, which will be
responsible for authentication, authorization and encryption in
WiMAX networks. The security sub-layer defines a so-called
privacy and key management (PKM) protocol, which considers
the employment of the X.509 digital certificate along with
the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public-key algorithm and
the advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm for both
user authentication as well as for key management and secure
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Fig. 12. WiMAX protocol stack: (a) PHY-MAC illustration, and (b) security
sub-layer specification.
transmissions. The initial PKM version (PKMv1) as specified
in early WiMAX standards (e.g., IEEE 802.16a/c) employs
an unsophisticated one-way authentication mechanism and
hence it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
To address this issue, an updated PKM version (PKMv2)
was proposed in the more sophisticated WiMAX standard
releases (e.g., IEEE 802.16e/m) [104], which relies on two-
way authentication. The following discussions detail both
the WiMAX authentication, as well as the authorization and
encryption processes.
Authentication in WiMAX is achieved by the PKM pro-
tocol, which supports two basic authentication approaches,
namely the RSA-based authentication and the extensible au-
thentication protocol (EAP)-based authentication [105]. Fig.
13 shows the RSA-based authentication process, where a
trusted certificate authority is responsible for issuing an X.509
digital certificate to each of the network nodes, including the
subscriber station (SS) and the WiMAX base station (BS). An
X.509 certificate contains both the public key and the MAC
address of its associated network node. During the RSA-based
authentication process shown in Fig. 13, when an SS receives
an authentication request from a WiMAX BS, it sends its
X.509 digital certificate to the BS, which then verifies whether
the certificate is valid or not. If the certificate is valid, the SS
is considered authenticated. By contrast, an invalid certificate
implies that the SS fails to authenticate.
The EAP-based authentication process is illustrated in Fig.
14, where a WiMAX BS first sends an identity request to an SS
who responds with its identity information. The WiMAX BS
then forwards the SS’ identity to an authentication, authoriza-
tion and accounting (AAA) server over a secure networking
protocol referred to as RADIUS. After that, the SS and AAA
server start the authentication process, where three different
EAP options are available depending on the SS and AAA
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Fig. 13. RSA-based authentication process.
Fig. 14. EAP-based authentication process.
server’s capability, including the EAP-AKA (authentication
and key agreement), EAP-TLS (transport layer security) and
EAP-TTLS (tunneled transport layer security). Finally, the
AAA server will indicate the success (or failure) of the
authentication and notify the SS.
Additionally, the authorization process is necessary for
deciding whether an authenticated SS has the right to access
certain WiMAX services [106]. In the WiMAX authorization
process, an SS first sends an authorization request message to
the BS that contains both the SS’ X.509 digital certificate,
as well as the encryption algorithm and the cryptographic
identity (ID). After receiving the authorization request, the BS
validates the SS’ request by interacting with an AAA server
and then sends back an authorization reply to the SS. Once
the positive authorization is confirmed, the SS will be allowed
to access its intended services. Following user authentication
and authorization, the SS is free to exchange data packets
with the BS. In order to guarantee transmission confidentiality,
WiMAX considers the employment of the AES algorithm for
data encryption, which is much more secure than the data
encryption standard (DES) algorithm [107]. Unlike the DES
that uses the Feistel cipher design principles of [107], the
AES cipher is based on a so-called substitution-permutation
network and has a variable block size of 128, 192, or 256 bits
[108]. This key-length specifies the number of transformation
stages used for converting the plain-text into cipher-text. In
WiMAX, the AES algorithm supports several different modes,
Fig. 15. LTE network architecture.
including the cipher-block chaining mode, counter mode, and
electronic codebook mode.
D. LTE
LTE is the most recent standard developed by the 3G
partnership project for next-generation mobile networks de-
signed for providing seamless coverage, high data rate and
low latency [109]. It supports packet switching for seamless
interworking with other wireless networks and also introduces
many new elements, such as relay stations, home eNodeB
(HeNB) concept, etc. A LTE network typically consists of an
evolved packet core (EPC) and an evolved-universal terrestrial
radio access network (E-UTRAN), as shown in Fig. 15 [90],
[110]. The EPC is comprised of a mobility management entity
(MME), a serving gateway, a packet data network gateway
(PDN GW) and a home subscriber server (HSS). Moreover, the
E-UTRAN includes a base station (also termed as eNodeB in
LTE) and several user equipments (UEs). If channel conditions
between the UEs and eNodeB are poor, a relay station may
be activated for assisting their data communications. Further-
more, both in small offices and in residential environments, a
HeNB may be installed for improving the indoor coverage by
increasing both the capacity and reliability of the E-UTRAN.
Although introducing these elements into LTE is capable of
improving the network coverage and quality, it has its own
new security vulnerabilities and threats.
In order to facilitate secure packet exchange between the
UEs and EPC, a so-called evolved packet system authentica-
tion and key agreement (EPS-AKA) protocol was proposed
for defending LTE networks against various attacks, including
redirection attacks, rogue base station attacks [111] and MITM
attacks. A two-way authentication process was invoked be-
tween the UEs and EPC, which is adopted in the EPS-AKA
protocol responsible for generating both the ciphering keys
(CKs) and integrity keys (IKs) [112]. Both the CKs and IKs
are used for data encryption and integrity check for enhancing
the confidentiality and integrity of LTE transmissions. Fig. 16
shows this two-way authentication process of the LTE system
using the EPS-AKA protocol, where an UE and a LTE network
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Fig. 16. Two-way authentication in LTE by using the EPS-AKA protocol.
should validate each other’s identity.
To be specific, the MME first sends a user identity ver-
ification request to the UE that then replies back with its
unique international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI). Next,
the MME sends an authentication data request to HSS, which
consists of the UE’s IMSI and the serving network’s identity.
Upon receiving the request, the HSS responds to the MME
by sending back an EPS authentication vector containing the
quantities (RAND, XRES, AUTN, KSIASME), where RAND
is an input parameter, while XRES is an output of the authenti-
cation algorithm at the LTE network side. Furthermore, AUTN
indicates the identifier of the network authority, while KSIASME
is the key set identity of the access security management
entity. Then, the MME sends an authentication request to the
UE containing the RAND, AUTN and KSIASME quantities.
As a result, the UE checks its received parameter AUTN for
authenticating the LTE network. If the network authentication
is successful, the UE generates the response RES and sends
it to the MME, which compares XRES with RES. If XRES
is the same as RES, this implies that the UE also passes the
authentication.
In the universal mobile telecommunications system
(UMTS), also known as the third generation mobile cellular
system, KASUMI [113] is used as the ciphering algorithm
for protecting the data confidentiality and integrity, which,
however, has several security weaknesses and hence it is
vulnerable to certain attacks, such as the related-key attack
[113]. To this end, the LTE system adopts a more secure
ciphering technique referred to as SNOW 3G [114] that is
a block-based ciphering solution used as the heart of LTE
confidentiality and integrity algorithms, which are referred to
as the UEA2 and UIA2, respectively [114]. The SNOW 3G
technique is referred to as a stream cipher having two main
components, namely an internal state of 608 bits controlled by
a 128-bit key and a 128-bit initialization vector (IV), which are
utilized for generating the cipher-text by masking the plain-
text. During the SNOW 3G operation process, we first perform
key initialization to make the cipher synchronized to a clock
signal and a 32-bit key stream word is produced in conjunction
with every clock.
In summary, in the aforementioned subsections A-D, we
have discussed the security protocols of Bluetooth, Wi-Fi,
WiMAX as well as of LTE and observed that the existing wire-
Fig. 17. A wireless scenario transmitting from source to destination in
multipath fading environments in the presence of an eavesdropper.
less networks tend to rely on security mechanisms deployed
at the upper OSI layers of Fig. 2 (e.g., MAC layer, network
layer, transport layer, etc.) for both user authentication and
data encryption. For example, the WEP and WPA constitute a
pair of security protocols commonly used in Wi-Fi networks
for guaranteeing the data confidentiality and integrity require-
ments, whereas WiMAX networks adopt the PKM protocol for
achieving secure transmissions in the face of malicious attacks.
By contrast, communication security at physical layer has
been largely ignored in existing wireless security protocols.
However, due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, the
physical layer of wireless transmission is extremely vulnerable
to both eavesdropping and jamming attacks. This necessitates
the development of physical-layer security as a complement
to conventional upper-layer security protocols. The following
section will introduce the physical-layer security paradigm
conceived for facilitating secure wireless communications.
V. WIRELESS PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY AGAINST
EAVESDROPPING
In this section, we portray the field of wireless physical-
layer security, which has been explored for the sake of
enhancing the protection of wireless communications against
eavesdropping attacks. Fig. 17 shows a wireless scenario
transmitting from a source to a destination in the presence
of an eavesdropper, where the main and wiretap links refer
to the channels spanning from the source to the destination
and to the eavesdropper, respectively. As shown in Fig. 17,
when a radio signal is transmitted from the source, multiple
differently delayed signals will be received at the destination
via different propagation paths due to the signal reflection,
diffraction and scattering experienced. Owing to the multipath
effects, the differently delayed signal components sometimes
add constructively, sometimes destructively. Hence, the at-
tenuation of the signal that propagated through the space
fluctuates in time, which is referred to as fading and it is
usually modeled as a random process. The signal received
at the destination may be attenuated significantly, especially
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when a deep fade is encountered, due to the shadowing in
the presence of obstacles (e.g., trees) between the source
and destination. Moreover, due to the broadcast nature of
radio propagation, the source signal may be overheard by
the eavesdropper, which also experiences a multipath fading
process. There are three typical probability distribution models
routinely used for characterizing the random wireless fading,
including the Rayleigh fading [115], Rice fading [116] and
Nakagami fading [117].
Recently, physical-layer security is emerging as a promising
paradigm designed for improving the security of wireless
transmissions by exploiting the physical characteristics of
wireless channels [33], [34], [118]. More specifically, it was
shown in [33] that reliable information-theoretic security can
be achieved, when the wiretap channel spanning from the
source to the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the main
channel between the source and the destination. In [34], a
so-called secrecy capacity was developed and shown as the
difference between the capacity of the main channel and that of
the wiretap channel, where a positive secrecy capacity means
that reliable information-theoretic security is possible and vice
versa. However, in contrast to wired channels that are typically
time-invariant, wireless channels suffer from time-varying
random fading, which results in a significant degradation of
the wireless secrecy capacity [119], especially when a deep
fade is encountered in the main channel due to shadowing by
obstacles (e.g., buildings, trees, etc.) appearing between the
source and destination. Hence considerable research efforts
have been devoted to the development of various physical-
layer security techniques, which can be classified into the
following main research categories:
1) information-theoretic security [119]-[125];
2) artificial noise aided security [126]-[130];
3) security-oriented beamforming techniques [131]-[136];
4) diversity-assisted security approaches [42], [137];
5) physical-layer secret key generation [147]-[161].
The aforementioned physical-layer security techniques are
summarized in Fig. 18. In the following, we will detail these
physical-layer security topics.
A. Information-Theoretic Security
Information-theoretic security examines fundamental lim-
its of physical-layer security measures from an information-
theoretic perspective. The concept of information-theoretic
security was pioneered by Shannon in [119], where the basic
theory of secrecy systems was developed with an emphasis
on the mathematical structure and properties. To be specific,
Shannon defined a secrecy system as a set of mathematical
transformations of one space (the set of legitimate plain-text
messages) into another space (the set of possible cryptograms),
where each transformation corresponds to enciphering the
information with the aid of a secret key. Moreover, the trans-
formation is non-singular so that unique deciphering becomes
possible, provided that the secret key is known. In [119],
the notions of theoretical secrecy and practical secrecy were
introduced, which was developed for the ease of guarding
against eavesdropping attacks, when an adversary is assumed
to have either infinite or more practically finite computing
power. It was shown in [119] that a perfect secrecy system
may be created, despite using a finite-length secret key, where
the equivocation at the adversary does not approach zero, i.e.
when the adversary is unable to obtain a unique solution to
the cipher-text. To elaborate a little further, the equivocation
is defined as a metric of quantifying how uncertain the
adversary is of the original cipher-text after the act of message
interception [119].
The secrecy system developed by Shannon in [119] is based
on the employment of secret keys. However, the key man-
agement is challenging in certain wireless networks operating
without a fixed infrastructure (e.g., wireless ad hoc networks)
[32]. To this end, in [33], Wyner investigated the information-
theoretic security without using secret keys and examined its
performance limits for a discrete memoryless wiretap channel
consisting of a source, a destination and an eavesdropper. It
was shown in [33] that perfectly secure transmission can be
achieved, provided that the channel capacity of the main link
spanning from the source node (SN) to its destination node
(DN) is higher than that of the wiretap link between the SN
and eavesdropper. In other words, when the main channel
conditions are better than the wiretap channel conditions,
there exists a positive rate at which the SN and DN can
reliably and securely exchange their information. In [34],
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Wyner’s results were further extended to a Gaussian wiretap
channel, where the notion of secrecy capacity was developed,
which was obtained as the difference between the channel
capacity of the main link and that of the wiretap link. If the
secrecy rate is chosen below the secrecy capacity, reliable
transmission from SN to DN can be achieved in perfect
secrecy. In wireless networks, the secrecy capacity is severely
degraded due to the time-varying fading effect of wireless
channels. This is because fading attenuates the signal received
at the legitimate destination, which reduces the capacity of
the legitimate channel, thus resulting in a degradation of the
secrecy capacity.
The family of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) sys-
tems is widely recognized as an effective means of mitigating
the effects of wireless fading, which simultaneously increases
the secrecy capacity in fading environments. In [120], Khisti
et al. investigated a so-called multiple-input single-output
multiple-eavesdropper (MISOME) scenario, where both the
source and eavesdropper are equipped with multiple anten-
nas, whereas the intended destination has a single antenna.
Assuming that the fading coefficients of all the associated
wireless channels are fixed and known to all nodes (i.e., to
the source, destination and eavesdropper), the secrecy capacity
of the MISOME scenario can be characterized in terms of its
generalized eigenvalues. Bearing in mind that the knowledge
of the wiretap channel’s impulse response is typically unavail-
able, Khisti et al. [121] advocated the employment of a so-
called masked beamforming scheme [118] for enhancing wire-
less physical-layer security, where the eavesdropper’s channel
knowledge is not relied upon for determining the transmit
directions. It was shown that the masked beamforming scheme
is capable of achieving a near-optimal security performance
at sufficiently high signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). Moreover,
Khisti et al. extended their results to time-varying wireless
channels and developed both an upper and a lower bound on
the secrecy capacity of the MISOME scenario operating in
Rayleigh fading environments. In a nutshell, the work of Khisti
et al. [121] was mainly focused on characterizing the secrecy
capacity of masked beamforming in an information-theoretic
sense, which thus belongs to the family of information-
theoretic security solutions.
As a further development, Khisti et al. [122] examined the
information-theoretic security achieved with the aid of mul-
tiple antennas in a more general scenario, where the source,
destination and eavesdropper are assumed to have multiple an-
tennas. They considered two cases: 1) the simplified and ideal-
ized deterministic case in which the channel state information
(CSI) of both the main links and of the wiretap links are fixed
and known to all the nodes; and 2) the more practical fading
scenario, where the wireless channels experience time-varying
Rayleigh fading and the source has the main channels’ perfect
CSI as well as the wiretap channels’ statistical CSI knowl-
edge. For the idealized deterministic case, they proposed the
employment of the generalized-singular-value-decomposition
(GSVD) based approach for increasing the secrecy capacity
in high SNR regions. The GSVD scheme’s performance was
then further investigated in the fading scenario and the corre-
sponding secrecy capacity was shown to approach zero if and
only if the ratio of the number of eavesdropper antennas to
source antennas was larger than two. Additionally, in [123],
Chrysikos et al. investigated the wireless information-theoretic
security in terms of outage secrecy capacity, which is used
for characterizing the maximum secrecy rate under a given
outage probability requirement. A closed-form expression of
the outage secrecy capacity was derived in [123] by using the
first-order Taylor series for approximation of an exponential
function.
The MIMO wiretap channel can also be regarded as a
MIMO broadcast channel, where SN broadcasts its confiden-
tial information to both its legitimate DN and unintention-
ally also to an unauthorized eavesdropper. Perfect secrecy
is achieved, when SN and DN can reliably communicate at
a positive rate, while ensuring that the mutual information
between the SN and eavesdropper becomes zero. In [124],
Oggier and Hassibi analyzed the secrecy capacity of multiple
antenna aided systems by converting the MIMO wiretap
channel into a MIMO broadcast channel, where the number
of antennas is arbitrary for both the transmitter and the pair
of receivers (i.e., that of DN and of the eavesdropper). It
was proven that through optimizing the transmit covariance
matrix, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel
is given by the difference between the capacity of the SN-
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to-DN channel and that of the SN-to-eavesdropper channel.
It was pointed out that the secrecy capacity results obtained
in [124] are based on the idealized simplifying assumption
that SN knows the CSI of both the main channels and of
the wiretap channels. This assumption is, however, invalid in
practical scenarios, since the eavesdropper is passive and hence
it remains an open challenge to estimate the eavesdropper’s
CSI. It is of substantial interest to study a more practical
scenario, where SN only has statistical CSI knowledge of
wiretap channels. To this end, the authors of [125] investigated
a twin-receiver MIMO broadcast wiretap channel scenario,
where the legitimate SN and DN are assumed to have no
knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI. A so-called ‘secrecy-
degree-of-freedom-region’ was developed for wireless trans-
mission in the presence of an eavesdropper and a GSVD
based scheme was proposed for achieving the optimal secrecy-
degree-of-freedom-region. The major information-theoretic se-
curity techniques are summarized in Table VIII.
B. Artificial Noise Aided Security
The artificial noise aided security allows SN to generate
specific interfering signals termed as artificial noise so that
only the eavesdropper is affected adversely by the interfering
signals, while the intended DN remains unaffected. This results
in a reduction of the wiretap channel’s capacity without
affecting the desired channel’s capacity and thus leads to an
increased secrecy capacity, which was defined as the difference
between the main channel’s and the wiretap channel’s capacity.
Hence, a security improvement is achieved by using artificial
noise. In [126], Goel and Negi considered a wireless network
consisting of a SN, a DN and an eavesdropper for investigating
the benefits of the artificial noise generation paradigm. More
specifically, SN allocates a certain fraction of its transmit
power for producing artificial noise, so that only the wiretap
channel condition is degraded, while the desired wireless trans-
mission from SN to DN remains unaffected by the artificial
noise. To meet this requirement, Goel and Negi [126] proposed
the employment of multiple antennas for generating artificial
noise and demonstrated that the number of transmit antennas
at SN has to be higher than that of the eavesdropper for
ensuring that the artificial noise would not degrade the desired
channel. It was shown that a non-zero secrecy capacity can
be guaranteed for secure wireless communications by using
artificial noise, even if the eavesdropper is closer to SN than
DN.
Although the artificial noise aided security is capable of
guaranteeing the secrecy of wireless transmission, this is
achieved at the cost of wasting precious transmit power re-
sources, since again, a certain amount of transmit power has to
be allocated for generating the artificial noise. In [127], Zhou
an McKay further examined the optimal transmit power shar-
ing between the information-bearing signal and the artificial
noise. They analyzed secure multiple-antenna communications
relying on artificial noise and derived a closed-form secrecy
capacity expression for fading environments, which was used
as the objective function for quantifying the optimal power
sharing between the information signal and artificial noise. The
simple equal-power sharing was shown to be a near-optimal
strategy, provided that the eavesdroppers do not collude with
each other to jointly perform interception. Moreover, as the
number of eavesdroppers increases, more power should be
allocated for generating the artificial noise. In the presence
of imperfect CSI, it was observed that assigning more power
to the artificial noise for jamming the eavesdroppers is capable
of achieving a better security performance than increasing the
transmit power of the desired information signal.
However, the aforementioned artificial noise aided security
work has been mainly focused on improving the secrecy capac-
ity without considering the quality of service (QoS) require-
ments of the legitimate DN. Hence, in order to address this
problem, a QoS based artificial noise aided security approach
was presented in [128] for minimizing the maximum attain-
able signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) encountered
at the eavesdroppers, while simultaneously guaranteeing a
satisfactory SINR at the intended DN. The optimization of
the artificial noise distribution was formulated based on the
CSIs of both the main channels and wiretap channels, which
was shown to be a non-deterministic polynomial-time hard
(NP-hard) problem. The classic semidefinite relaxation (SDR)
technique [128] was used for approximating the solution of
this NP-hard problem. Liao et al. [128] demonstrated that the
proposed QoS-based artificial noise aided security scheme is
capable of efficiently guarding against eavesdropping attacks,
especially in the presence of a large number of eavesdroppers.
Li and Ma [129] proposed a robust artificial noise aided
security scheme for a MISOME wiretap channel. Assuming
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that SN has perfect CSI knowledge of the main channels,
but imperfect CSI knowledge of the wiretap channels, an
optimization problem was formulated for the secrecy rate
maximization with respect to both the desired signal’s and the
artificial noise’s covariance, which is a semi-infinite optimiza-
tion problem and can be solved with the aid of a simple one-
dimensional search algorithm. It was shown that the proposed
robust artificial noise design significantly outperforms conven-
tional non-robust approaches in terms of its secrecy capacity.
In addition to relying on multiple antennas for artificial
noise generation, cooperative relays may also be utilized
for producing artificial noise to guard against eavesdropping
attacks. In [130], the authors studied the employment of
cooperative relays for artificial noise generation and proposed
a secret wireless communications protocol, where a messaging
relay was used for assisting the legitimate transmissions from
SN to DN and a set of intervening relays were employed
for generating the artificial noise invoked for jamming the
eavesdroppers. The main focus of [130] was to quantify how
many eavesdroppers can be tolerated without affecting the
communications secrecy in a wireless network supporting a
certain number of legitimate nodes. It was shown that if the
eavesdroppers are uniformly distributed and their locations
are unknown to the legitimate nodes, the tolerable number of
eavesdroppers increases linearly with the number of legitimate
nodes. The major artificial noise aided security techniques are
summarized in Table IX.
C. Security-Oriented Beamforming Techniques
The family of security-oriented beamforming techniques
allows SN to transmit its information signal in a particular
direction to the legitimate DN, so that the signal received at
an eavesdropper (that typically lies in a direction different from
DN) experiences destructive interference and hence it becomes
weak. Thus, the received signal strength (RSS) of DN would
become much higher than that of the eavesdropper with the
aid of security-oriented beamforming, leading to a beneficial
secrecy capacity enhancement. In [131], the authors proposed
the employment of cooperative relays to form a beamforming
system relying on the idealized simplifying assumption of
having the perfect CSI knowledge of all the main channels
as well as of the wiretap channels and conceived a decode-
and-forward relay based beamforming design for maximizing
the secrecy rate under a fixed total transmit power constraint.
The formulated problem was then solved by using the classic
semi-definite programming and second-order cone program-
ming techniques. It was shown in [131] that the proposed
beamforming approach is capable of significantly increasing
the secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions.
In [132], multiple antennas were used for beamforming
in order to improve the attainable secrecy capacity of wire-
less transmissions from SN to DN in the presence of an
eavesdropper. In contrast to the work presented in [131],
where the perfect CSI knowledge of the wiretap channel was
assumed, Mukherjee and Swindlehurst conceived the optimal
beamforming designs in [132] without relying on the idealized
simplifying assumption of knowing the eavesdropper’s CSI,
albeit the exact CSI of the main channel spanning from SN
to DN was still assumed to be available. However, the perfect
CSI of the main channel is typically unavailable at SN. To this
end, Mukherjee and Swindlehurst further studied the impact of
imperfect CSI on the attainable physical-layer security perfor-
mance and presented a pair of robust beamforming schemes
that are capable of mitigating the effect of channel estimation
errors. It was shown that the proposed robust beamforming
techniques perform well for moderate CSI estimation errors
and hence achieve a higher secrecy capacity than the artificial
noise aided security approaches.
In addition, the authors of [133] investigated the benefits
of transmit beamforming in an amplify-and-forward relay
network consisting of a SN, a RN and a DN, where the RN
is indeed potentially capable of improving the SN-to-DN link,
but it is also capable of launching a passive eavesdropping
attack. Hence, a pair of secure beamforming schemes, namely
a non-cooperative and a cooperative secure beamformers were
proposed for maximizing the secrecy capacity of the SN-
to-DN link. Extensive simulation results were provided for
demonstrating that the secure beamforming schemes proposed
are capable of outperforming conventional security approaches
in terms of the attainable secrecy capacity. Moreover, in
[134], a cross-layer approach exploiting the multiple simulta-
neous data streams of the family of operational IEEE 802.11
standards was devised by using zero-forcing beamforming,
where a multi-antenna assisted AP was configured to utilize
one of its data streams for communicating with the desired
user, while the remaining data streams were exploited for
actively interfering with the potential eavesdroppers. Extensive
experimental evaluations were carried out in practical indoor
WLAN environments, demonstrating that the proposed zero-
forcing beamforming method consistently granted an SINR
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Fig. 19. A MIMO wireless system consisting of a SN and a DN in the
presence of an eavesdropper, where M , Nd and Ne represent the number of
antennas at SN, DN and eavesdropper, respectively.
for the desired user, which was 15dB higher than that of the
eavesdropper.
Naturally, this beamforming technique may also be com-
bined with the artificial noise based approach for the sake
of further enhancing the physical-layer security of wireless
transmissions against eavesdropping attacks. Hence, in [135],
the authors examined a joint beamforming and artificial noise
aided design for conceiving secure wireless communications
from SN to DN in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
The beamforming weights and artificial noise covariance were
jointly optimized by minimizing the total transmit power
under a specific target secrecy rate constraint. To elaborate a
little further, this joint beamforming and artificial noise aided
design problem was solved by using a two-level optimization
approach, where the classic semidefinite relaxation method
and the golden section based method [135] were invoked for
the inner-level optimization and the outer-level optimization,
respectively. Numerical results illustrated that the joint beam-
forming and artificial noise aided scheme significantly im-
proves the attainable secrecy capacity of wireless transmission
as compared to the conventional security-oriented beamform-
ing approaches. In [136], Romero-Zurita et al. studied the
joint employment of spatial beamforming and artificial noise
generation for enhancing the attainable physical-layer security
of a MISO channel in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers,
where no CSI knowledge was assumed for the wiretap channel.
The optimal power sharing between the information signal and
artificial noise was examined under a specific guaranteed se-
crecy probability requirement. By combining the beamforming
and artificial noise techniques, both the security and reliability
of wireless transmissions were substantially improved. The
major security-oriented beamforming techniques are summa-
rized in Table X.
D. Diversity Assisted Security Approaches
This subsection is focused on the portrayal of diversity
techniques invoked for the sake of improving the physical-
Fig. 20. A multiuser diversity system consisting of a BS and M users in
the presence of an eavesdropper.
layer security of wireless transmissions [137]. In contrast to
the artificial noise aided approaches, which dissipate additional
power assigned to the artificial noise generation, the diversity-
aided security paradigm is capable of enhancing the wireless
security without any additional power. Traditionally, diversity
techniques have been used for improving the attainable trans-
mission reliability, but they also have a substantial potential in
terms of enhancing the wireless security against eavesdropping
attacks. Below we will discuss several diversity-aided security
approaches, including multiple-antenna aided diversity, mul-
tiuser diversity and cooperative diversity.
Multiple-antenna aided transmit diversity has been shown
to constitute an effective means of combatting the fading
effect, hence also increasing the secrecy capacity of wireless
transmissions [138], [139]. As shown in Fig. 19, provided
that SN has multiple antennas, the optimal antenna can be
activated for transmitting the desired signal, depending on
whether the CSI of the main channel and of the wiretap
channel is available. To be specific, if the CSI of both the
main channel and of the wiretap channel is known at SN, the
specific transmit antenna associated with the highest secrecy
capacity can be chosen as the optimal antenna to transmit
the desired signal, which has the potential of significantly
improving the secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions. If
only the main channel’s CSI is available, we can choose a
transmit antenna associated with the highest main channel
capacity to transmit the desired signal. Since the transmit
antenna selection is exclusively based on the main channel’s
CSI and the wiretap channel is typically independent of the
main channel, the main channel’s capacity will be increased
with the aid of transmit antenna selection, while no capacity
improvement can be achieved for the wiretap channel. This
finally results in an increase of the secrecy capacity, as an
explicit benefit of transmit antenna selection.
The multiuser diversity of Fig. 20 also constitutes an
effective means of improving the physical-layer security in
the face of eavesdropping attacks. Considering that a base
station (BS) serves multiple users in a cellular network, an
orthogonal multiple access mechanism, such as the orthogonal
frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) of LTE [140]
or code-division multiple access (CDMA) of 3G systems
[141], enables the multiple users to communicate with the
BS. Considering the OFDMA as an example, given a slot or
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Fig. 21. A cooperative diversity system consisting of a SN, M relays and a
DN in the presence of an eavesdropper.
subband of OFDM subcarriers, we should determine which
particular user is assigned to access this specific subband for
data transmission. More specifically, a user is enabled with the
aid of multiuser scheduling to access the OFDM subband and
then starts transmitting its signal to the BS. Meanwhile, due
to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, an eavesdropper
may intercept the source message. In order to effectively pro-
tect the wireless transmission against eavesdropping attacks,
the multiuser scheduling should be designed for minimizing
the capacity of the wiretap channel, while maximizing the
capacity of the main channel [142]. This action requires the
CSI of both the main channel and of the wiretap channel.
If only the main channel’s CSI is available, the multiuser
scheduling can be designed for maximizing the main channel’s
capacity without the wiretap channel’s CSI knowledge. It is
worth mentioning that the multiuser scheduling is capable of
significantly improving the main channel’s capacity, while the
wiretap channel’s capacity remains the same, which results
in a secrecy capacity improvement with the aid of multiuser
diversity, even if the CSI of the wiretap channel is unknown.
As an alternative, cooperative diversity [143], [144] also
has a great potential in terms of protecting the wireless trans-
missions against eavesdropping attacks. When considering a
wireless network consisting of a single SN, multiple RNs
and a DN as shown in Fig. 21, the multiple relays can be
exploited for assisting the signal transmission from SN to
DN. In order to prevent the eavesdropper from intercepting
the source signal from a security perspective, the best relay
selection emerges as a means of improving the security of
wireless transmissions against eavesdropping attacks [145].
Specifically, a RN having the highest secrecy capacity (or the
highest main channel capacity if only the main channel’s CSI
is known) is selected to assist the SN’s transmission to the
intended DN. By using the best RN selection, a beneficial
cooperative diversity gain can be achieved for the sake of
increasing the secrecy capacity, which explicitly demonstrates
the advantages of wireless physical-layer security.
E. Physical-Layer Secret Key Generation
In this subsection, we present the family of wireless secret
key generation techniques by exploiting the physical-layer
characteristics of radio propagation, including the amplitude
and phase of wireless fading [146]. To be specific, as shown in
Fig. 22, a pair of legitimate transceivers, namely Alice and Bob
are connected through a reciprocal wireless channel, where
the fading gain of the main channel spanning from Alice to
Bob, denoted by hab, is identical to that from Bob to Alice,
namely hba. Since Alice and Bob can directly estimate hba
and hab, respectively, using classic channel estimation methods
[147], [148], they may exploit their estimated CSIs hˆba and
hˆab for the secret key generation and agreement process. By
contrast, a third party (e.g., Eve) based at a different location
experiences independent wiretap channels of hae and hbe,
which are uncorrelated with the CSIs hab and hba of the main
legitimate channel between Alice and Bob, as seen in Fig.
22. Since Alice and Bob both estimate the main channel by
themselves without exchanging their estimated CSIs hˆab and
hˆba over the air, it is impossible for Eve to acquire the main
channel’s CSI for deriving and duplicating the secret keys.
The secret key extraction and agreement process based on
the physical characteristics of the main channel is capable
of achieving reliable information-theoretic security without
resorting to a fixed key management infrastructure [149].
The research of physical-layer key generation and agree-
ment can be traced back to the middle of the 1990s [150],
[151], where the feasibility of generating secret keys based
on the wireless channel’s CSI was shown to achieve reliable
information-theoretic security without devising any practical
key extraction algorithms. To this end, a RSS based secret
key extraction algorithm was proposed in [152] by exploiting
RSS measurements of the main channel in order to generate
secret bits for an IEEE 802.11 network in an indoor wireless
environment. In [153], Jana et al. further investigated the
key generation rate of RSS based secret key extraction in
diverse wireless environments. It was shown in [153] that it is
possible to generate secret bits at a sufficiently high rate based
on the wireless channel variations in highly dynamic mobile
scenarios. However, in static environments, where the network
devices are fixed, the rate of bits generated is too low to be
suitable for a secret key, which is due to the lack of random
variations in the wireless channels.
To this end, Gollakota and Katabi [154] proposed the so-
called iJam approach, which processed the desired transmit
signal in a specific manner that still allows the legitimate
receiver to decode the desired signal, but prevents the potential
eavesdroppers from decoding it. The iJam scheme renders the
secret key generation both fast and independent of the wireless
channel variations. Furthermore, a testbed was also developed
in [154] for implementing the iJam technique using USRP2
radios and the IEEE 802.11 specifications. The associated
experimental results demonstrated that the iJam scheme was
indeed capable of generating the physical-layer secret keys
faster than conventional approaches. To be specific, the iJam
scheme generated secret keys at a rate of 3-18 Kb/s without
any measurable disagreement probability, whereas the conven-
tional approaches exhibited a maximum generation rate of 44
bits/s in conjunction with a 4% bit disagreement probability
between the legitimate transmitter and receiver. More recently,
an extension of the RSS based key extraction from a twin-
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Fig. 22. A wireless system consisting of two legitimate transceivers (Alice
and Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve).
device system to a multi-device network was studied in [155],
where a collaborative key generation scheme was proposed
for multiple devices by exploiting the RSS measurements and
then experimentally validating it in both indoor and outdoor
environments.
Although it is feasible to exploit the RSS for wireless secret
key extraction and agreement, the RSS based methods have
a low key generation rate, which limits their applications in
practical wireless systems. In order to alleviate this problem,
the channel phase may also be considered as an alternative
means of assisting the generation of secret keys, which is ca-
pable of beneficially exploiting the phase measurements across
different carriers and thus enhances the secret key generation
rate. In [156], Shehadeh et al. proposed a channel phase based
key agreement scheme, which generates secret bits from the
time-varying frequency-domain characteristics in an OFDM
based wireless system. More specifically, the OFDM system’s
subcarrier phase correction process was studied in the context
of secret key generation, showing that the employment of
higher fast Fourier transform (FFT) sizes is potentially capable
of improving the secret bit generation rate. Additionally,
the authors of [157] employed multiple randomized channel
phases for conceiving an efficient key generation scheme,
which was evaluated through both analytical and simulation
studies. This solution was found to be highly flexible in the
context of multiuser wireless networks and increased the secret
key generation rate by orders of magnitude. It has to be pointed
out that exploiting the phase measurements across multiple
OFDM subcarriers is beneficial in terms of increasing the
attainable key generation rate. However, the channel phase
extracted by a pair of legitimate devices is unlikely to be
reciprocal due to the different hardware characteristics of
the different devices. This non-reciprocity embedded in the
phase measurements results in a high disagreement rate for
the legitimate devices during the generation of secret keys.
As an alternative, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
techniques used by the legitimate transceivers are capable of
significantly increasing the channel’s randomness, which can
be exploited for secret key generation and agreement, leading
to the concept of MIMO based key generation. In [158], a
theoretical characterization of the MIMO based key generation
was explored in terms of deriving a performance limit on
the number of secret key bits generated per random channel
realization, assuming that the main channel and the wiretap
channel are Rayleigh distributed. As a further development,
Zeng et al. proposed a practical multiple-antenna based secret
key generation protocol in [159], which was implemented for
an IEEE 802.11 network in both indoor and outdoor mobile
environments. It was also shown in [160] that even if an eaves-
dropper is capable of increasing the number of its antennas, it
cannot infer more information about the secret keys generated
from the main channel. However, the secrecy improvement of
MIMO based secret key generation is achieved at the cost of an
increased system complexity, since more computing and mem-
ory resources are required for estimating the MIMO channel,
as the number of transmit/receive antennas increases. In order
to further improve the reliability and efficiency of secret key
generation, the employment of relay nodes was investigated in
[160] for assisting the secret key generation in two different
scenarios, namely in conjunction with a single-antenna aided
relay and a multiple-antenna assisted relay, respectively. It was
demonstrated in [160] that the relay channel based key gen-
eration method is capable of substantially improving the key
generation rate in Rayleigh fading environments. Although the
relay nodes can be exploited for enhancing the key generation
rate, they may become compromised by an adversary aiming
for launching malicious activities. Hence, it is of interest to
explore the security issues associated with untrusted relays as
well as the corresponding countermeasures.
It is worth mentioning that the success of the aforemen-
tioned physical-layer key generation solutions rely on the
assumption that the main channel between the transmitter
and legitimate receiver is reciprocal and uncorrelated with
the wiretap channel experienced at an eavesdropper located
more than half-a-wavelength away from the legitimate re-
ceiver. However, this assumption has not been rigorously
evaluated in the open literature and indeed, it maybe invalid in
some practical scenarios, which do not experience extensive
multipath scattering. It was shown in [161] that in reality
a strong correlation may be encountered between the main
channel and the wiretap channel, even when the eavesdropper
is located significantly more than half-a-wavelength away from
the legitimate receiver. In [161], the authors demonstrated that
a so-called passive inference attacker is potentially capable of
exploiting this correlation for inferring a part of the secret keys
extracted between a pair of legitimate devices. Additionally,
in [162], Eberz et al. presented a practical man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack against the physical-layer key generation and
showed that the MITM attack can be readily launched by
impersonating the legitimate transmitter and receiver as well
as by injecting the eavesdropper’s data packets. It was demon-
strated in [162] that the MITM attack is capable of imposing
intentional sabotaging of the physical-layer key generation by
inflicting a high key disagreement rate, whilst additionally
inferring up to 47% of the secret keys generated between the
legitimate devices.
In order to mitigate the effects of MITM attacks, Shi et al.
[163] examined the potential benefits of simultaneous device
authentication and secret key extraction based on the wireless
physical-layer characteristics, where an authenticated secret
key generation (ASK) scheme was proposed by exploiting
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TABLE XI
MAJOR PHYSICAL-LAYER SECRET KEY GENERATION TECHNIQUES.
the heterogeneous channel characteristics in the context of
wireless body area networks. Specifically, in case of simple
routine body movements, the variations of wireless channels
between line-of-sight on-body devices are relatively insignifi-
cant, while the wireless channels between the non-line-of-sight
devices fluctuate quiet significantly. The ASK scheme exploits
the relatively static channels for reliable device authentica-
tion and the dynamically fluctuating channels for secret key
generation. Extensive experiments were conducted by using
low-end commercial-off-the-shelf sensors, demonstrating that
the ASK scheme is capable of effectively authenticating body
devices, while simultaneously generating secret keys at a high
rate. More importantly, the ASK is resilient to MITM attacks,
since it performs the authentication and key generation simul-
taneously. Consequently, it becomes difficult for an MITM
attacker to promptly pass through the authentication phase
and to get involved in the resultant key generation phase.
The major physical-layer secret key generation techniques are
summarized in Table XI at a glance.
VI. WIRELESS JAMMING ATTACKS AND THEIR
COUNTER-MEASURES
As mentioned earlier, due to the shared nature of radio
propagation, wireless transmissions are vulnerable to both the
eavesdropping and jamming attacks. In the previous section,
we have presented a comprehensive overview of how physical-
layer security may be exploited for guarding against eaves-
dropping. Let us now focus our attention on the family of
wireless jamming attacks and their counter-measures in this
section. In wireless networks, a jamming attack can be simply
launched by emitting unwanted radio signals to disrupt the
transmissions between a pair of legitimate nodes.
The objective of a jamming attacker (also referred to as
jammer) is to interfere with either the transmission or the
reception (or both) of legitimate wireless communications. For
example, a jammer may continuously transmit its signal over
a shared wireless channel so that legitimate nodes always find
the channel busy and keep deferring their data transmissions.
This, however, is energy-inefficient, since the jammer has to
transmit constantly. To improve its energy efficiency, a jammer
may opt for transmitting an interfering signal only when it
detects that a legitimate transmitter is sending data. There
are many different types of wireless jammers, which may be
classified into the following five categories [164]:
1) constant jammer, where a jamming signal is continuously
transmitted;
2) intermittent jammer, where a jamming signal is emitted
from time to time;
3) reactive jammer, where a jamming signal is only im-
posed, when the legitimate transmission is detected to be
active;
4) adaptive jammer, where a jamming signal is tailored to
the level of received power at the legitimate receiver;
5) intelligent jammer, where weaknesses of the upper-layer
protocols are exploited for blocking the legitimate transmis-
sion.
Clearly, the first four types of jammers all exploit the
shared nature of the wireless medium and can be regarded
as wireless physical-layer jamming attacks. By contrast, the
intelligent jammer attempts to capitalize on the vulnerabilities
of the upper-layer protocols [165], including the MAC, net-
work, transport and application layers. Typically, the network,
transport and application layers are defined in the TCP/IP pro-
tocols and not specified in wireless standards (e.g., Bluetooth,
WLAN, etc.), which are responsible for the PHY and MAC
specifications only. The jammers targeting the network, trans-
port and application layers essentially constitute DoS attacks
(e.g., Smurf attack, TCP/UDP flooding, Malware attack, etc.),
which have been summarized in Section III-C to Section III-
E. Let us now discuss the aforementioned five main types of
wireless jamming attacks and their counter-measures in a little
more detail.
A. Constant Jammer
Again, the constant jammer continuously transmits a jam-
ming signal over the shared wireless medium. The jamming
signal can have an arbitrary waveform associated with a
limited bandwidth and constrained power, including but not
limited to pseudo-random noise, modulated Gaussian wave-
forms, or any other signals. The effect of a constant jammer
is twofold. On the one hand, it increases the interference and
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noise level for the sake of degrading the signal reception qual-
ity at a legitimate receiver. On the other hand, it also makes
a legitimate transmitter always find the wireless channel busy,
which keeps preventing the legitimate transmitter from gaining
access to the channel. Hence, the constant jammer is capable
of disrupting the legitimate communications, regardless of
the specific wireless system. However, the constant jammer
is energy-inefficient, since it has to continuously transmit a
jamming signal.
The basic idea behind detecting the presence of a con-
stant jammer is to identify an abnormal signal received at a
legitimate receiver [164], [166]. There are certain statistical
tests that can be exploited for the detection of the constant
jammer, such as the received signal strength (RSS), carrier
sensing time (CST), and packet error rate (PER), etc. To
be specific, the RSS test is based on a natural measurement
used for detecting the presence of a constant jammer, since
the signal strength received at a legitimate node would be
directly affected by the presence of a jamming signal. The RSS
detector first accumulates the energy of the signal received
during an observation time period and then compares the
accumulated energy to a predefined threshold to decide as
to whether a constant jammer is present or absent. If the
accumulated energy is higher than the threshold, implying
that a jamming signal may be present, then the presence of a
constant jammer is confirmed. As an alternative, the CST can
also be used as a measurement for deciding whether a constant
jammer is preventing the legitimate transmission or not, since
the CST distribution will be affected by the jammer. More
specifically, the presence of a jamming signal may render the
wireless channel constantly busy and hence might lead to an
unusually high CST, which can be used for jammer detection.
Additionally, the PER is defined as the number of unsuc-
cessfully decoded data packets divided by the total number of
received packets, which can also be used for detecting the pres-
ence of a jamming signal, since the legitimate communications
will be severely corrupted by the constant jammer, leading
to an unduly high PER. Normally, the legitimate wireless
communications links operating in the absence of a jammer
should have a relatively low PER (e.g., lower than 0.1). Indeed,
it was shown in [166] that even in a highly congested network,
the PER is unlikely to exceed 0.2. By contrast, in the presence
of an effective jammer, the legitimate data transmissions will
be overwhelmed by the jamming signal and background noise.
This would result in an excessive PER, close to one [166],
which indicates that indeed, the PER may be deemed to be an
effective measurement for detecting the presence of a constant
jammer. Conversely, an ineffective jammer, which only slightly
affects the PER, fails to inflict a significant damage upon
the legitimate wireless system and thus may not have to be
detected for invoking further counter-measures.
Once the presence of a jammer is detected, it is necessary
to decide upon how to defend the legitimate transmissions
against jamming attacks. Frequency hopping is a well-known
classic anti-jamming technique [167]-[169], which rapidly
changes the carrier frequency with the aid of a pseudo-random
sequence known to both the transmitter and receiver. The
frequency hopping regime can be either proactive or reactive.
In proactive frequency hopping, the transmitter will proac-
tively perform pseudo-random channel switching, regardless
of the presence or absence of the jammer. Hence, proactive
hopping does not have to detect the presence of a jammer.
By contrast, reactive frequency hopping starts switching to
a different channel only when the presence of a jamming
signal is detected. Compared to proactive hopping, reactive
hopping has the advantage of requiring a reduced number
of frequency hops for achieving a certain level of secrecy.
Overall, frequency hopping is highly resistant to jamming
attacks, unless of course the jammer has explicit knowledge of
the pseudo-random hopping pattern. Typically, cryptographic
techniques are used for generating the pseudo-random hopping
pattern under the control of a secret key that is pre-shared by
the legitimate transmitter and receiver.
B. Intermittent Jammer
An attacker, which transmits a jamming signal from time
to time for the sake of interfering with the legitimate commu-
nications, is referred to as an intermittent jammer [170]. The
intermittent jammer transmits for a certain time and then sleeps
for the remaining time. Typically, increasing the sleeping time
would save more energy for the jammer, which of course
comes at the cost of a performance degradation in terms of
the jamming effectiveness, since less time becomes available
for transmitting the jamming signal. The jammer can strike a
trade-off between the jamming effectiveness and energy sav-
ings by appropriately adjusting the transmit time and sleeping
time. Hence, compared to the constant jammer, the intermittent
jammer generally reduces the energy consumption, which is
attractive for energy-constrained jammers.
Similarly to the constant jammer, the presence of an inter-
mittent jammer will affect the same statistical measurements of
the legitimate transmissions, including the RSS, CST and PER,
which thus can be used for its detection. After detecting an
intermittent jammer, again frequency hopping may be activated
for protecting the legitimate transmissions. More specifically,
when a legitimate node is deemed to be jammed, it switches
to another channel and communicates with its destination over
the newly established link.
C. Reactive Jammer
The reactive jammer starts to transmit its jamming signal
only when it detects that the legitimate node is transmitting
data packets [171], [172]. This type of jammer first senses
the wireless channel and upon detecting that the channel is
busy, implying that the legitimate user is active, it transmits a
jamming signal for the sake of corrupting the data reception
at the legitimate receiver. The success of a reactive jammer
depends on its sensing accuracy concerning the legitimate
user’s status. For example, when the legitimate signal received
at a reactive jammer is weak (e.g., due to fast fading and
shadowing effects) and hence cannot be detected, the reactive
jammer then becomes ineffective in jamming the legitimate
transmissions. In contrast to both constant and intermittent
jammers that attempt to block the wireless channel regardless
of the legitimate traffic activity on the channel, the reactive
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jammer remains quiet when the channel is idle and starts
emitting its jamming signal only when the channel is deemed
to be busy. This implies that the reactive jammer is more
energy-efficient than both the constant and the intermittent
jammers.
The detection of the presence of a reactive jammer is
typically harder than that of the constant and intermittent
jammers. As discussed above, the constant and intermittent
jammers both intend to interfere with the reception of a
legitimate data packet as well as to hinder the transmission
of the legitimate packets by maliciously seizing the wireless
channel. By contrast, a reactive jammer inflicts less damage,
since it corrupts the reception without affecting the legitimate
transmitter’s activity to gain access to the wireless channel.
This means that the CST becomes an ineffective measurement
for detecting the reactive jammer. Since the reception of legiti-
mate wireless communications will be affected in the presence
of a reactive jammer, we can still consider the employment of
RSS and PER based techniques for the detection of the reactive
jammer. Generally, an abnormal increase of the RSS and/or
a surprisingly high PER indicate the presence of a reactive
jammer.
An effective technique of preventing a reactive jammer
from disrupting communications is to assist the legitimate
user in becoming undetectable, because then the jammer
remains silent. Direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) [173]
techniques spread the radio signal over a very wide frequency
bandwidth, so that the signal has a low power spectral density
(PSD), which may even be below the background noise level.
This makes it difficult for a reactive jammer to differentiate
the DSSS modulated legitimate signal from the background
noise. In this way, the reactive jammer may become unable
to track the legitimate traffic activity and thus cannot disrupt
the legitimate transmissions. Additionally, the aforementioned
frequency hopping technique is also effective in guarding
against a reactive jamming attack, as long as the hopping rate
is sufficiently high (e.g., faster than the jammer reacts).
D. Adaptive Jammer
The adaptive jammer refers to an attacker who can adjust
its jamming power to any specific level required for disrupting
the legitimate receiver [174]. More specifically, in wireless
communication systems, the RSS depends on the time-varying
fading. If the main channel spanning from the transmitter to
the legitimate receiver is relatively good and the signal arriving
at the legitimate receiver is sufficiently strong, the adaptive
jammer may have to increase its jamming power for the sake
of corrupting the legitimate reception. One the other hand,
if the main channel itself is experienced an outage due to a
deep fade, then naturally, the legitimate receiver is unable to
succeed in decoding its received signal even in the absence of
a jammer. In this extreme case, no jamming power is needed
for the adaptive jammer. Hence, compared to the constant,
intermittent and reactive jammers, the adaptive jammer is the
most energy-efficient jamming attacker, which can achieve
the highest energy efficiency when aiming for disrupting the
legitimate transmissions. It can be observed that the adaptive
jammer should have the RSS knowledge of the legitimate
receiver for adapting its jamming power, which, however,
is challenging for a jammer to obtain in practice, since the
main channel’s RSS varies in time and it is unknown to the
jammer. This limits the application of the adaptive jammer in
practical wireless systems. The adaptive jammer usually serves
as an idealized optimum jamming attacker for benchmarking
purposes.
The detection of an adaptive jammer is challenging in the
sense that it will dynamically adjust its jamming power to
conceal its existence. Similarly to the reactive jammer, the
adaptive jammer transmits nothing if the legitimate trans-
mission is deemed to be inactive, implying that the CST
technique is ineffective for detecting the adaptive jammer.
Although the RSS and PER based solutions can be employed
for detecting the presence or absence of an adaptive jammer,
the separate employment of the two individual statistics may
be insufficient. As a consequence, Xu et al. proposed a so-
called consistency check method in [166], which relies on the
joint use of the RSS and PER measurements. To be specific,
if both the RSS and PER are unexpectedly high, it is most
likely that there is a jammer, which results in a high RSS due
to the presence of a jamming signal that interferes with the
legitimate reception, leading to a high PER. If we encounter a
low RSS and a high PER, this implies that the main channel is
poor. Moreover, the joint occurrence case of a high RSS and
low PER indicates that the legitimate transmissions perform
well. Finally, it is unlikely in general, that both the RSS and
PER are low simultaneously.
As mentioned above, the adaptive jammer is an idealized
adversary who is assumed to have knowledge of the legitimate
signal characteristics, including the RSS, carrier frequency and
bandwidth, waveform, and so on. In order to guard against
such a sophisticated jamming attacker, a simple but effective
defense strategy is to evade the adversary. Hence in [166], Xu
et al. proposed a pair of evasion methods to defend against
jamming attacks, namely the channel surfing and the spatial
retreating solutions. To be specific, in channel surfing, the
legitimate transmitter and receiver are allowed to change their
jammed channel to a new channel operating at the link layer,
which is a different philosophy from that of frequency hopping
operating at the physical layer. The spatial retreating technique
enables a jammed wireless node to move away and escape
from the jammed area to avoid the jamming signal. In case of
spatial retreating, it is crucial to accurately determine the posi-
tion of jammers, which enables the victims to move away from
the jammed area. To this end, in [175], Liu et al. proposed an
error-minimizing framework for accurately localizing multiple
jammers by relying on a direct measurement of the jamming
signal strength, demonstrating its advantage over conventional
methods in terms of its localization accuracy.
E. Intelligent Jammer
The jamming attackers discussed so far belong to the
family of physical-layer jammers operating without taking into
account any upper-layer protocol specifications. By contrast,
an intelligent jammer is assumed to have a good understanding
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Fig. 23. IEEE 802.11 DCF process.
of the upper-layer protocols and attempts to jam the vitally
critical network control packets (rather than data packets)
by exploiting the associated protocol vulnerabilities. This
subsection is mainly focused on the jamming of MAC control
packets. For example, let us consider the MAC jamming of the
IEEE 802.11 standard (also known as Wi-Fi) that is widely
used for WLANs [176]. The IEEE 802.11 MAC procedure
is referred to as the distributed coordination function (DCF)
[177], which is shown in Fig. 23. To be specific, if a source
node senses the channel to be idle, it waits for a time period
termed as the distributed inter-frame space (DIFS) and then
sends a request-to-send (RTS) control frame to an access
point (AP). After succeeding in decoding the RTS frame and
waiting for a time period called the short inter-frame space
(SIFS), the AP will send a clear-to-send (CTS) control frame,
which indicates that the AP is ready to receive data packets.
Finally, the source node waits for a SIFS time duration and
starts transmitting a data packet to the AP, which will send an
acknowledgement (ACK) frame after a SIFS time interval to
confirm that it successfully decoded the data packet.
In order to block the legitimate communications between
the source node and the AP of Fig. 23, an intelligent jammer
can simply corrupt the RTS/CTS control frames, rather than
data packets, which minimizes its energy consumption. There
are several different types of intelligent jamming attackers,
including the RTS jammer, CTS jammer and ACK jammer.
More specifically, an RTS jammer senses the channel to be
idle for a DIFS time period, and then transmits a jamming
signal for corrupting a possible RTS packet. By contrast, a
CTS jammer attempts to detect the presence of an RTS frame
and upon detecting the RTS arrival, it waits for the RTS period
plus a SIFS time interval before sending a jamming pulse for
disrupting the CTS frame. The CTS jamming strategy will
result in a zero throughput for the legitimate transmissions,
since no data packets will be transmitted by the source node
without successfully receiving a CTS frame. Similarly to
the CTS jamming, an ACK jammer also senses the wireless
medium. Upon detecting the presence of a packet, it waits for
a SIFS time interval at the end of the data packet transmission
and then jams the wireless channel, leading to the corruption
of an ACK frame. If the source node constantly fails to receive
the ACK, it will finally give up transmitting data packets to
the AP.
The aforementioned intelligent jammers can be detected
by tracing the traffic of MAC control packets to identify
abnormal events in terms of sending and/or receiving RTS,
CTS and ACK frames. For example, if the AP (or source
node) consistently fails to send and receive the RTS, CTS or
ACK, it may indicate the presence of an intelligent jammer.
As mentioned earlier, an intelligent jammer takes advantage
of specific upper-layer protocol parameters for significantly
degrading the network performance. In order to defend against
such an intelligent jammer, a protocol hopping approach,
as a generalization of the physical-layer frequency hopping,
was proposed in [178], which allows legitimate nodes to
hop across various protocol parameters that the jammer may
exploit. A game-theoretic framework was formulated in [178]
for modeling the interactions between an intelligent jammer
and the protocol functions, which was shown to achieve an
improved robustness against intelligent jamming attacks.
Finally, Table XII summarizes the characteristics of the con-
stant, intermittent, reactive, adaptive and intelligent jammers
in terms of their energy efficiency, jamming effectiveness,
implementation complexity and prior knowledge requirements.
As shown in Table XII, the constant and intermittent jammers
have a low implementation complexity and required no prior
knowledge for effectively jamming the legitimate commu-
nications, but their energy efficiency is poor. By contrast,
the adaptive and intelligent jammers achieve a high energy
efficiency and jamming effectiveness, which however, require
some prior knowledge (e.g., the legitimate main channel qual-
ity, the protocol parameters, etc.) and have a high complexity.
As an alternative, the reactive jammer exhibits a high jamming
effectiveness and at the same time, achieves a moderate
performance in terms of its energy efficiency, implementation
complexity and prior knowledge requirements.
VII. INTEGRATION OF PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY INTO
EXISTING WIRELESS NETWORKS
As discussed earlier, the authentication and encryption
constitute of a pair of salient techniques adopted in exist-
ing wireless security architectures for satisfying the stringent
authenticity and integrity requirements of wireless networks
(e.g., Wi-Fi, LTE, etc.). Meanwhile, physical-layer security
has emerged as a new means of enhancing the security of
wireless communications, which is typically considered as a
complement to the existing classic authentication and cryptog-
raphy mechanisms, rather than replacing them [179]. Recently,
there has witnessed a growing research efforts devoted to the
integration of physical-layer security into the existing body of
classic wireless authentication and cryptography [179]-[193].
Below we present an in-depth discussion on the physical-
layer authentication and cryptography solutions conceived for
wireless networks.
Authentication constitutes an essential security requirement
designed for reliably differentiating authorized nodes from
unauthorized ones in wireless networks. Conventionally, the
MAC address of a network node has been used for authenti-
cation, which is however, vulnerable to MAC spoofing attacks
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and can be arbitrarily changed for the sake of impersonating
another network node. To this end, an increasing research
attention has been devoted to the physical-layer authentication
[180]-[190] of wireless networks, where either the hardware
properties of radio-frequency (RF) based devices (also known
as device fingerprints) or the propagation characteristics of
wireless channels (e.g. the time-varying fading) have been
employed for authentication. This line of work is based on
the premise that both the device fingerprints and the wireless
channels are unique and non-forgeable by an adversary. To
elaborate a little further, the random manufacturing imper-
fections lead to the fact that a pair of RF devices, even
produced by the same manufacturing and packaging process,
would have different hardware specifications, as exemplified
by their clock timing deviations and carrier frequency offsets
(CFO), which can be invoked as unique fingerprints for device
identification. Additionally, as mentioned in Section V-E, an
adversary located at least at a distance of half-a-wavelength
away from the legitimate receiver experiences an independent
fading channel. This would make it a challenge for the
adversary to predict and mimic the wireless channel between
the legitimate users, which can thus be used as a unique link-
specific signature for physical-layer authentication.
Specifically, in [180], a clock timing based hardware fin-
gerprinting approach was proposed for differentiating the
authorized devices from spoofing attackers in Wi-Fi networks,
which is passive and non-invasive, hence requiring no extra
cooperation from the fingerprintee hosts. It was shown by
extensive experiments that the clock timing based fingerprint
identification is accurate and very effective in differentiating
between Wi-Fi devices. Later on, Brik et al. [181] considered
the joint use of multiple distinctive radiometric signatures,
including the frequency error, synchronization frame corre-
lation, I/Q offset, magnitude error, and phase error, which
were inferred from the modulated symbols for identifying
different IEEE 802.11 network nodes. This technique was
termed as PARADIS [181]. Quantitatively, the experimental
results demonstrated that by applying sophisticated machine-
learning algorithms, PARADIS was capable of differentiating
the legitimate nodes with a probability of at least 99% in a
set of more than 130 network nodes equipped with identical
802.11 NICs in the presence of background noise and wireless
fading.
As a design alternative, a CFO based physical-layer authen-
tication scheme was proposed in [182], where the expected
CFO was estimated with the aid of Kalman filtering fed
with previous CFO estimates. Then, the expected CFO was
compared to the current CFO estimate in order to determine,
whether the received radio signal obeys a consistent CFO
pattern. To be specific, if the difference between the expected
CFO and current CFO estimate was higher than a predefined
threshold, it indicated the presence of an unknown wireless
device. Moreover, the threshold value was adaptively adjusted
based on both the background noise level and on the Kalman
prediction based errors for the sake of further improving the
authentication accuracy. Additionally, a SDR based prototype
platform was developed in [182] for validating the feasibility
of the proposed CFO based wireless device authentication in
the face of multipath fading channels.
In addition to the device fingerprint based authentication
solutions [180]-[182], the wireless channel is also considered
as an effective metric for device authentication [183]-[187].
Specifically, in [183], Xiao et al. studied the employment
of channel probing and responses for determining whether
an unauthorized user is attempting to invade a wireless net-
work. The reliability of the proposed CSI based authentication
scheme was analyzed in the face of complex Gaussian noise
environments. The simulation results relying on the ray-
tracing tool WiSE validated the efficiency of the CSI based
authentication approach under a range of realistic practical
channel conditions. However, this approach is vulnerable to
the so-called mimicry attacker, which is able to forge a CSI
signature, as long as the attacker roughly knows the radio
signal at the legitimate receiver’s location. In order to guard
against the mimicry attack, a time-synchronized link signature
was presented in [184] by integrating the timing factor into
the wireless physical-layer features. The provided experi-
mental results showed that the proposed time-synchronized
physical-layer authentication is indeed capable of mitigating
the mimicry attack with a high probability.
More recently, in [185], the angle-of-arrival (AoA) infor-
mation was exploited as a highly sensitive physical-layer
signature for uniquely identifying each client in IEEE 802.11
networks. To be specific, a multi-antenna AP was relied upon,
in order to estimate all the directions a client’s radio signals
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arrive from. Once spotting a suspicious transmission, the AP
and the client initiate an AoA signature-based authentication
protocol for mitigating the attack. It was shown in [185]
that the proposed AoA signature-based authentication scheme
was capable of preventing 100% of Wi-Fi spoofing attacks,
whilst maintaining a false alarm probability of just 0.6%. As
a further development, Du et al. [186] examined the extension
of physical-layer authentication from single-hop communica-
tion networks to dual-hop scenarios by proposing a pair of
physical-layer authentication mechanisms, namely the PHY-
CRAMR and PHY-AUR techniques for wireless networks
operating in the presence of an untrusted relay. The security
performance of the PHY-CRAMR and PHY-AUR techniques
was analyzed by relying on extensive simulations, showing
that both schemes are capable of achieving a high successful
authentication probability and a low false alarm rate, especially
at sufficiently high SNRs.
It is worth mentioning that all the aforementioned consti-
tutions [180]-[186] have primarily been focused on exploiting
the device fingerprints or channel characteristics by relying
on their intrinsic randomness. However, these stochastic fea-
tures are beyond our control. As a consequence, in [187]-
[189] Yu et al. explored the benefits of a sophisticated de-
liberate fingerprint embedding mechanism for physical-layer
‘challenge-response’ authentication, which facilitated striking
flexible performance trade-offs by design. More precisely,
a stealthy fingerprint was superimposed onto the data in
the deliberate fingerprinting mechanism, whilst additionally
both the data and an authentication message were transmitted
separately by relying on conventional tag-based authentication
methods [190]. Naturally, the authentication message used in
conventional tag-based methods reduces the spectral efficiency,
whilst at the same time, being exposed to eavesdropping. By
contrast, a deliberately embedded fingerprint can be designed
by ensuring that it has high spectral efficiency and remains
impervious to eavesdropping. It was shown in [187]-[189] that
a compelling trade-off between the stealth, security and ro-
bustness can be struck by the deliberate fingerprint embedding
based approach in wireless fading environments.
Having presented a range of physical-layer authentication
techniques [180]-[190], let us now consider the integration of
physical-layer security with classic cryptographic approaches
[179], [191]-[193]. Traditionally, the cryptographic techniques
relying on secret keys have been employed for protecting
the communication confidentiality. However, the distribution
and management of secret keys remains quite a challenging
task in wireless networks. To this end, Abdallah et al. [179]
have investigated the subject of physical-layer cryptography
by exploiting the existing automatic repeat request (ARQ)
protocol for achieving the reliable exchange of secret keys
between the legitimate users without any information leakage
to passive eavesdroppers. Specifically, in [191], the secret bits
were distributed across the ARQ packets and only the 1-
bit ACK/NACK feedback from the legitimate receiver was
exploited for key sharing. It was shown in [191] that a useful
non-zero secrecy rate can be achieved even when the wiretap
channel spanning from the source to the eavesdropper has a
better condition than the legitimate main channel.
Fig. 24. Classification of physical-layer authentication and cryptography.
Additionally, Xiao et al. studied the benefits of ARQ
mechanisms in terms of generating so-called dynamic secrets
by taking advantage of the inevitable information loss in error-
prone wireless communications, where the dynamic secrets
are constantly extracted from the communication process with
the aid of hash functions 1. It was shown in [192] that the
dynamic secret mechanism is complementary to the family of
existing security protocols and it has the benefit of being time-
variant, hence remains hard to reveal. However, in [191] and
[192], the ARQ feedback was assumed to be perfectly received
and decoded without errors, which may not be practical due
to the presence of hostile channel impairments. In order to
make these investigations more realistic, the authors of [193]
modeled the practical ARQ feedback channel as a correlated
erasure channel and evaluated both the secrecy outage prob-
ability and the secrecy capacity of ARQ aided physical-layer
cryptography. It was shown in [193] that a significant secrecy
improvement can be achieved even when the eavesdropper’s
channel conditions are unknown to the legitimate users.
In summary, we have presented an in-depth review con-
cerning the integration of physical-layer security with clas-
sic wireless security mechanisms, including physical-layer
authentication and cryptography. As shown in Fig. 24, the
physical-layer authentication techniques may be classified into
three categories, namely the RF hardware properties based,
wireless channel characteristics based, and deliberate finger-
print based authentication approaches [180]-[189]. Meanwhile,
in the subject of physical-layer cryptography, the existing
research efforts [191]-[193] have mainly been focused on ex-
ploiting the classic ARQ protocol for securing the exchange of
secret keys between legitimate users, where even the realistic
practical ARQ feedback associated with transmission errors
has been considered.
VIII. OPEN CHALLENGES AND FUTURE WORK
This section presents a range of challenging open issues and
future directions for wireless security research. As mentioned
in the previous sections, extensive research efforts have been
devoted to this subject, but numerous challenges and issues
still remain open at the time of writing.
1A hash function is any function that is capable of converting an input data
of variable size to an output data of fixed size.
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A. Mixed Attacks in Wireless Networks
Most of the physical-layer security research [119]-[193]
only addressed the eavesdropping attacks, but has neglected
the joint consideration of different types of wireless attacks,
such as eavesdropping and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. It
will be of particularly importance to explore new techniques
of jointly defending against multiple types of wireless attacks,
which may be termed as mixed wireless attacks. In order
to effectively guard against mixed attacks including both
eavesdropping and DoS attacks, we should aim for minimizing
the detrimental impact of interference inflicted by DoS attacks
on the legitimate transmission. The security defense mecha-
nism should not only consider the CSI of the interfering ink
spanning from the DoS attacker to the legitimate receiver, but
ideally should also take into account the CSI of the wiretap
link between the legitimate transmitter and the eavesdropper,
in addition to the CSI of the main link from the legitimate
transmitter to the legitimate receiver. It will be of interest
to investigate the security defense mechanisms in different
scenarios in the presence of both full and partial knowledge
of the CSI of the main link as well as of the interfering link
and that of the wiretap link. The full CSI based scenario will
provide a theoretical performance upper bound as a guide
for developing new signal processing algorithms to guard
against mixed attacks. Moreover, considering the fact that the
eavesdropper remains silent and the CSI of the wiretap channel
is typically unknown, it is of practical interest to conceive
security protocols for the scenario, where the eavesdropper’s
CSI is unavailable.
B. Joint Optimization of Security, Reliability and Throughput
Security, reliability and throughput constitute the main
driving factors for the research and development of wireless
networks [194]. In conventional wireless systems, the mecha-
nisms assuring security, reliability and throughput are designed
individually and separately, which is however potentially sub-
optimal, since the three factors are coupled and affect each
other [195]. For example, the reliability and throughput of
the main link can be improved by increasing the source’s
transmit power, which however also increases the capacity
of the wiretap channel spanning from the source to the
eavesdropper and raises the risk that the eavesdropper succeeds
in intercepting the source message through the wiretap link.
Similarly, although increasing the data rate at SN improves
the security level by reducing the probability of an intercept
event, it comes at the expense of a degradation in transmis-
sion reliability, since the outage probability of the main link
increases for higher data rates. Therefore, it is necessary to
investigate the joint optimization of security, reliability and
throughput for the sake of maintaining secure, reliable and
high-rate wireless communications, which is an open challenge
to be solved in the future. The goal of the joint optimization
is to maximize the wireless security performance under the
target reliability and throughput requirements. For example,
convex optimization and game theory may be considered
for formulating and solving the security-reliability-throughput
tradeoff in wireless networks.
C. Cross-Layer Wireless Security Design and Analysis
Presently, cross-layer aided security design is in its infancy.
The goal of wireless cross-layer aided security design is to
enable efficient information exchange among different protocol
layers for the sake of improving the level of wireless security
with minimal network overhead. In general, wireless networks
adopt the layered OSI protocol architecture that consists of the
physical layer, MAC layer, network layer, transport layer and
application layer. Traditionally, the aforementioned protocol
layers have been protected separately in order to meet their
individual communications security requirements, including
their authenticity, integrity and confidentiality [10]. However,
these traditional layered security mechanisms are potentially
inefficient, since each protocol layer introduces additional
computational complexity and latency. For example, in order
to meet the authenticity requirements, the existing wireless
networks typically adopt multiple authentication approaches at
different layers, including MAC-layer authentication, network-
layer authentication and transport-layer authentication. The
employment of multiple separate authentication mechanisms
at different protocol layers improves the security level of
wireless networks, which, however, comes at the expense of
a high complexity and latency. As a consequence, it will
be of high interest to explore the benefits of cross-layer
aided wireless security in order to guard against the above-
mentioned mixed wireless attacks. Intuitively, the physical-
layer characteristics and properties of wireless channels may
also be further exploited by the upper-layer security algo-
rithms, including the user authentication, secret key generation
and data protection algorithms. It is anticipated that the cross-
layer security framework will further improve the wireless
security at a reduced cost, as compared to the traditional
layered security mechanisms.
D. Physical-Layer Security for the Emerging 5G Systems
Given the proliferation of smart devices and the increasing
demand for multimedia communications, the amount of mobile
traffic has substantially grown in recent years and it may
soon exceed the capacity of the operational fourth-generation
(4G) mobile communications systems [196]. To meet this
challenging requirement, substantial efforts have been devoted
to the research and development of the fifth-generation (5G)
mobile systems [197]-[200] relying on advanced wireless
technologies, such as the massive MIMOs and millimeter wave
(mmWave) solutions. Meanwhile, it is expected that a strict
security requirement is desired for the 5G systems, since more
and more sensitive information (e.g., financial data, personal
emails and files) will be transmitted wirelessly [196]-[198]. To
this end, physical-layer security as a beneficial complement to
conventional security mechanisms will have a great potential
in the context of 5G systems. For instance, by deploying a
large number of antennas in 5G systems, the aforementioned
artificial noise and beamforming assisted techniques can be
readily utilized for improving the transmission performance
of legitimate users, while degrading the reception quality of
eavesdroppers. However, the application of massive MIMOs
for enhancing the physical-layer security also has its own
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challenges to be addressed, such as the deleterious effects of
pilot contamination, power allocation and channel reciprocity
[196]. Therefore, it is of high importance to explore the
opportunities and challenges of combining the physical-layer
security techniques with 5G enabling technologies, such as
massive MIMOs and mmWave solutions.
E. Field Experiments for Physical-Layer Security Investiga-
tions
As discussed above, there are various physical-layer secu-
rity schemes including the artificial noise, beamforming and
diversity aided security enhancement approaches, which have
been shown to be effective in terms of improving both the
secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage probability of wireless
communications [126]-[146]. However, their security benefits
have so far only been shown theoretically relying on idealized
simplifying assumptions, such as the availability of perfect CSI
knowledge [201], [202]. By considering the artificial noise
based method as an example, the accurate CSI of the main
channel is required for the appropriate design of an artificial
noise, so that the legitimate receiver remains unaffected by the
noise, while the eavesdropper is interfered with. However, re-
gardless of the specific channel estimation methods used [148],
[149], estimation errors always contaminate the estimation of
the CSI, hence the perfect CSI estimation cannot be achieved
in practical wireless systems. Given an inaccurate CSI, it is
impossible to devise an artificial noise that only interferes
with the eavesdropper without affecting the legitimate receiver.
Typically, the less accurate the CSI of the main channel,
the more interference is received at the legitimate receiver,
hence resulting in a degradation of the wireless physical-layer
security. Similarly, the CSI estimation errors would also cause
a performance degradation for the beamforming- and diversity-
aided security approaches. However, it remains unclear to
what extent the CSI estimation error affects the attainable
physical-layer security performance in terms of the secrecy
capacity and secrecy outage probability. It will be of great
benefit to conduct field experiments for the sake of verifying
the efficiency of various physical-layer security approaches in
real wireless communications systems in the presence of both
jamming and eavesdropping attacks.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a survey of the wire-
less security challenges and defense mechanisms conceived
for protecting the authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and
availability of wireless transmissions against malicious attacks.
We have discussed the range of wireless attacks and security
threats potentially experienced at different protocol layers
from the application layer to the physical layer, which are
classified into application-layer and transport-layer attacks,
network-layer, MAC-layer as well as physical-layer attacks.
Then, existing security paradigms and protocols conceived
for guarding against the different protocol layers’ attacks
have been reviewed in the context of several widely de-
ployed wireless networks, including the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi,
WiMAX and LTE. Bearing in mind that wireless transmis-
sions are highly vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks owing
to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, we have also
discussed the state-of-the-art in physical-layer security, which
is emerging as a promising paradigm of defending the wire-
less transmissions against eavesdropping attacks by exploiting
the physical-layer characteristics of wireless channels. More
specifically, several physical-layer security techniques, includ-
ing information-theoretic security, artificial noise aided secu-
rity, security-oriented beamforming, diversity-assisted security
and physical-layer secret key generation approaches have
been presented as well as compared. Additionally, we have
summarized various types of wireless jamming attacks along
with their detection and prevention techniques. Finally, we
have also discussed the integration of physical-layer security
into classic wireless authentication and cryptography, as well
as highlighted a range of open challenges to be addressed:
• Mixed wireless attacks, where new theories and tech-
niques have to be explored for jointly defending the
system against multiple types of wireless attacks;
• Joint optimization of security, reliability and throughput,
where an efficient wireless transmission mechanism has
to be developed by maximizing the security performance
under specific target reliability and throughput require-
ments;
• Cross-layer wireless security design, where a cross-layer
security framework has to be investigated for the sake
of improving the wireless security at a reduced security
overhead and latency as compared to the conventional
layered security mechanisms, where the OSI protocol
layers are protected separately.
• 5G physical-layer security, where the combination of
physical-layer security with 5G enabling technologies,
such as massive MIMOs and mmWave solutions has to
be explored for the sake of meeting the strict security re-
quirements imposed by the emerging 5G communication
systems.
• Field experiments, where the efficiency of various
physical-layer security approaches has to be verified with
the aid of field tests in real wireless communications
systems without the idealized simplifying assumptions
that are routinely used in theoretical studies.
Based on the solutions presented throughout this paper, we
provide some general guidelines for wireless communications
security design:
• Wireless networks are based on the layered OSI protocol
architecture that consists of the application layer, trans-
port layer, network layer, MAC layer and physical layer.
Each layer shall be protected in order to meet the security
requirements of wireless networks. Bearing in mind the
fact that the different layers support different protocols
and exhibit different security vulnerabilities, the security
mechanisms invoked by the different wireless protocols
should be customized so as to guard against malicious
attacks as efficiently as possible.
• The security paradigms, such as user authentication and
data encryption used in conventional wireless networks
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are typically designed separately at the different proto-
col layers, which, however, results in high latency and
overhead. To this end, cross-layer security would be a
candidate for protecting wireless networks against various
attacks. To be specific, the physical-layer characteristics
of wireless channels may be potentially considered and
exploited for designing or customizing the upper-layer
security algorithms, including the identity authentication,
key generation and so on.
• The secrecy capacity of wireless communications in the
presence of eavesdroppers may be severely degraded
due to the time-varying multipath fading effects, which
may be significantly mitigated by exploiting a range
of diversity-aided techniques, such as time diversity,
frequency diversity and spatial diversity. For example,
spatial diversity can be achieved for the sake of attaining
the wireless secrecy capacity improvements by using
multiple antennas at the legitimate transmitter and/or the
legitimate receiver.
• The multiuser scheduling may be employed for the sake
of achieving the multiuser diversity gain to improve the
wireless secrecy capacity. Additionally, multiuser MIMO
may be invoked for further improvements in secrecy
capacity, which combines the benefits of the multiuser
diversity as well as the MIMO diversity and multiplexing
gains.
• Artificial noise generation techniques may be used for im-
proving the wireless physical-layer security against eaves-
dropping attacks by ensuring that only the eavesdropping
attackers are adversely affected by the artificial noise,
while the legitimate receiver is unaffected. In order to
maximize the security benefits of using the artificial noise
assisted method, the power sharing between the desired
information-bearing signals and the artificial noise should
be given careful attention.
• It is worth mentioning that additional power resources are
dissipated in generating the artificial noise to confuse the
eavesdropper. Given a fixed total transmit power, increas-
ing the artificial noise power is capable of deteriorating
the eavesdropper’s channel condition, it, however, comes
at the cost of performance degradation of the legitimate
receiver, since less transmit power is available for the
desired signal transmission. Hence, the power allocation
between the artificial noise and desired signal should
be carefully considered for the sake of optimizing the
wireless physical-layer security.
• Beamforming approaches may also be invoked for im-
proving the wireless security design, which enables the
legitimate transmitter to send its information signal in a
particular direction to the legitimate receiver by ensuring
that the signal received at the legitimate receiver expe-
riences constructive interference, whereas that received
at an eavesdropper experiences destructive interference.
Moreover, combining the beamforming and the artificial
noise aided techniques would further enhance the wireless
physical-layer security against eavesdropping attacks.
• The security benefits of the artificial noise generation
and beamforming techniques are typically maximized at
the cost of a throughput or reliability degradation. The
conventional mechanisms assuring the security, reliability
and throughput are designed separately, which are not
optimized jointly. It is therefore suggested to consider the
joint optimization of security, reliability and throughput
for secure wireless communications. For example, the
joint optimization problem may be addressed by maxi-
mizing the wireless security performance under the target
reliability and throughput requirements.
• CSIs of the main channel and/or the wiretap channel are
essential in assuring the wireless physical-layer security
against eavesdropping attacks. Both the artificial noise
and beamforming aided security approaches rely on the
CSIs. The accuracy of estimated CSIs has a significant
impact on the physical-layer security performance (e.g.,
the secrecy capacity). It is thus suggested to employ the
pilot-based channel estimation approaches, rather than the
semi-blind or blind channel estimation, for the sake of
obtaining accurate CSIs.
• Performing the accurate channel estimation increases the
complexity of the wireless transceiver, especially in fast-
fading channels, where the CSI has to be estimated more
frequently and the CSI feedback rate has to be increased,
resulting in higher transmission overhead in terms of both
bandwidth and power. Hence, some balanced system de-
sign principles are suggested, where the wireless secrecy
capacity may be sacrificed with the intention of reducing
the CSI estimation complexity and feedback overhead.
• Physical-layer key generation and agreement techniques
are capable of generating secret keys based on the ran-
dom variations of wireless fading channels for securing
wireless networks without the need for a fixed key man-
agement infrastructure. However, in static environments,
where the wireless nodes are stationary, the channel
fading would fluctuate slowly, resulting in a limited
number of secret bits to be generated. In these cases, we
may consider the employment of MIMO-aided and relay-
assisted methods for enhancing the channel’s randomness
for the sake of improving the secret key generation rate.
• Wireless communications can be disrupted by a jammer
at the physical layer by transmitting an interfering signal.
Although the FHSS technique is capable of effectively
guarding against some of the known physical-layer jam-
ming attacks, the frequency hopping pattern agreement
between the legitimate transceivers is challenging in
wireless networks. It is therefore advisable to combine
FHSS with physical-layer security by exploiting the char-
acteristics of wireless channels for the frequency hopping
pattern agreement.
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